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THE AFFORDABILITY PARADOX: HOW CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY’S GREATEST WEAKNESS MAY ACCOUNT
FOR ITS SURPRISING SUCCESS
ANGELA LITTWIN*
ABSTRACT
When the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA) made consumer bankruptcy more expensive
for all debtors, it inadvertently reignited a debate about how to make
the system more affordable for its neediest beneficiaries. Even before
BAPCPA, consumer bankruptcy suffered from the irony that those
who needed it the most were often too poor to take advantage of its
relief. 
The seemingly obvious solution to this problem is to eliminate the
major cost that consumer bankruptcy filers bear, that of paying their
own lawyers. But in our rush to undo the harm caused by BAPCPA’s
worsening of the affordability problem, we risk moving consumer
bankruptcy too far in the opposite direction and undermining the
benefits that a judicial system with paid consumer lawyers has
provided. The cost increases driven by BAPCPA were not a bank-
ruptcy-only event, but rather were part of a broader movement in
which policymakers generally sought to make safety net programs
less accessible. Consumer bankruptcy’s lawyer- and judge-based
framework may have protected it from the worst effects of this trend.
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INTRODUCTION
When BAPCPA made consumer bankruptcy more expensive for
all debtors, it inadvertently reignited a debate about how to make
the system more affordable for its neediest beneficiaries. Even
before BAPCPA, consumer bankruptcy suffered from the irony that
those who needed it the most were often too poor to take advantage
of its relief. 
The seemingly obvious solution to this problem is to eliminate the
major cost that consumer bankruptcy filers bear: that of paying
their own lawyers. But in our rush to undo the harm caused by
BAPCPA’s worsening of the affordability problem, we should not
move the system too far in the opposite direction. Consumer
bankruptcy’s system of paid legal professionals appears to have
played a protective role with respect to the recent statutory changes.
The type of reform embodied by BAPCPA was not a bankruptcy-only
phenomenon, but was instead part of a broader movement in which
policymakers sought to make many redistributive programs less
accessible. Consumer bankruptcy’s lawyer- and judge-based frame-
work appears to have shielded it from the worst effects of this trend.
In 2005, Congress passed the first major bankruptcy reform in
nearly three decades.1 BAPCPA’s congressional proponents were
driven by moral outrage at what they perceived to be the large
number of consumers shirking their debts—and by the considerable
lobbying efforts of the consumer credit industry, which drafted the
bill.2 The new legislation was billed as a way of preventing high-
income, “can-pay” debtors from walking away from their debts in
Chapter 7.3 Bankruptcy filers with relatively high incomes and low
1. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
2. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005
Bankruptcy Act: Resistance Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 96 n.16; Susan
Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 518 (2005).
3. Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow,
Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J.
349, 351 (2008).
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expenses would now be required to complete a repayment program
in Chapter 13 or to forgo bankruptcy relief altogether.4
But instead of limiting the changes to those affecting higher-
income debtors, Congress implemented sweeping reforms that
increased the procedural burdens for everyone. Although the heart
of the bill was the means test that bars relatively well-off debtors
from Chapter 7,5 BAPCPA also subjected all filers to increased
paperwork,6 stricter deadlines,7 new prerequisites such as credit
counseling,8 and mandatory dismissals for myriad procedural
mistakes.9 These new technical requirements caused many com-
mentators to worry that the statute’s real effect would be to increase
costs and reduce the bankruptcy access of all debtors, especially the
worst off.10 At least one scholar has persuasively argued that a
decline in overall accessibility was, in fact, the main point.11
This use of procedural barriers to reduce substantive access
highlights the extent to which BAPCPA did not take place in a
bankruptcy vacuum, but rather was a part of a broader contraction
of the social safety net. The term “bureaucratic disentitlement” was
developed in the welfare literature to describe this reform strategy,
that of using purported abuse-prevention tools to decrease overall
program use,12 and it applies equally well in the bankruptcy context.
The parallels do not end there. Consumer bankruptcy filers are
stigmatized like government benefits recipients,13 and the changes
enacted by BAPCPA mirror those wrought by welfare reform in the
1990s in important ways.14 Most critically, these programs are
threatened by the same underlying moral anxiety: the fear that they
4. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2) (West 2010 Supp.).
5. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
6. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 521.
7. See id. § 521(i).
8. See id. § 109(h).
9. See id. § 521(i).
10. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means,
7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407 (2002). 
11. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007
U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 378-79. Professor James J. White has made a similar point, although he
argues in more hypothetical terms. James J. White, Abuse Prevention 2005, 72 MO. L. REV.
863, 874 (2006).
12. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part I.C.
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enable a strategic few to receive something for nothing while others
work for what they get.15 All redistributive programs are subject to
a deep ambivalence rooted in this fear of abuse.16 These pressures
mean that a system may become only so effective before it draws
negative attention. Bankruptcy is particularly vulnerable because
of the consumer credit industry’s permanent interest in encouraging
these fears.17
BAPCPA’s attempts at bureaucratic disentitlement have been
partially successful. The number of consumer bankruptcy filings
plummeted in the wake of BAPCPA, although empirical analysis
has found no decrease in the percentage of high-income bankruptcy
filers who were suspected of abusing the system.18 This suggests
that the dramatic decline in program use was not a targeted, abuse-
related reduction and that BAPCPA was operating less like a
surgical scalpel than a blunt knife. The new procedural barriers
introduced by BAPCPA are a likely cause of this decrease.19
Anecdotal accounts from the time of implementation suggest that
many debtors were intimidated by the new law.20
Technical hurdles may also reduce access indirectly by raising
legal costs. Procedural complexity increases the amount of time
lawyers must invest in each case and therefore the amount they
must charge to remain in business. In this context, it is not
surprising that one of BAPCPA’s major effects was a rise in the cost
of representation.21 Debtors who cannot afford the higher legal fees
may delay or forgo bankruptcy.22
15. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
16. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Local Legal Culture and the Fear of Abuse, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 25, 25 (1998) (applying the phrase “fear of abuse” to the consumer
bankruptcy context).
17. See infra notes 59-64, 468-79 and accompanying text.
18. Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 353. 
19. See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 2, at 122 (“In the weeks before October 17, 2005, the
general effective date of the new law, fear of the coming changes produced a huge spike in
filings. Attorney advertising and media accounts about the new law had tended to make
consumer debtors think they should act fast to avoid higher costs and new barriers.”) (internal
citations omitted).
21. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
22. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289,
290, 323-24 (2010); infra Part II. 
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The access problem does not end once a debtor reaches the
courthouse. Debtors for whom post-BAPCPA lawyers are out of
reach have an additional option: to file for bankruptcy without one.
Thus, the experiences of filers who proceed pro se can serve as one
way to examine changes in the system’s accessibility. This Article
provides original data on that point.
My empirical analysis indicates that the percentage of pro se
debtors has increased post-BAPCPA, despite the fact that these
cases are not succeeding.23 The pro se debtors I studied had sta-
tistically significantly lower incomes and asset levels than their
represented counterparts, which may signify that the expense of
hiring a lawyer was a barrier to representation.24 In addition, the
high pro se failure rate since 2005 suggests that it is reasonable to
equate the inability to afford a lawyer with having less than full
access to the bankruptcy system.25
If this is the case, then consumer bankruptcy lawyers may
generally have become unreasonably expensive. Even debtors who
do hire lawyers struggle to afford them, and they may be paying for
technical complexity in the form of lawyers’ fees they can ill afford.
There is emerging evidence that legal costs play a key role in
determining when debtors file for bankruptcy, with some delaying
their bankruptcies by many months in order to save up for represen-
tation.26 Every month a debtor spends saving up for an increasingly
expensive bankruptcy lawyer is a month in which she has lost
substantive bankruptcy rights for procedural reasons.
But the success of BAPCPA’s attempt at bureaucratic disen-
titlement is far from complete. These pro se findings are disastrous
from the perspective of consumer bankruptcy before 2005, but they
appear more benign when compared with the record of U.S. safety
net programs that have taken the other path and attempted to
establish systems that can function without the expense of claimant
lawyers. 
23. See infra Part II.B.2.
24. See infra notes 184-92 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.C.
26. See Mann & Porter, supra note 22, at 323-24; infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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The main approach has been an administrative one.27 Instead of
a court-based system for determining safety net relief, these pro-
grams are run by executive branch agencies in which civil servants
dispense benefits in informal proceedings. Theoretically, these
agencies should be more efficient than courts and less costly for
claimants, who are not necessarily expected to hire counsel. Because
administrative systems appear to save their financially distressed
claimants this major expense, the idea of converting consumer
bankruptcy to such a system has attracted multiple generations of
reformers.28 This idea has garnered renewed interest in the wake of
BAPCPA’s exacerbation of consumer bankruptcy’s affordability
problem.29
The theoretical advantages of organizing safety net programs
under executive agencies, however, have frequently not materialized
in practice. Administrative benefits systems such as welfare, social
security disability, and veterans’ benefits have a long, troubled
history in the United States.30 These programs tend to create tech-
nical barriers that dwarf those imposed by BAPCPA and leave
claimants mired in bureaucracy for years at a time.31 They suffer
from shortages of lawyers available to help claimants navigate these
hurdles.32 Additionally, the caliber of the officials who make benefits
decisions tends to decline over the life of a program.33 Currently, a
significant portion of the frontline decision makers in these admin-
istrative benefits systems lack college degrees.34 The cumulative
effect of these trends is that the quality of decision making tends to
be poor. Claimants suffer through multiple rounds of appeals, re-
mands, and further appeals before reaching a final result.35
Viewed through this lens, consumer bankruptcy is a relative
success in terms of accessibility.36 Despite an initial drop in the
wake of BAPCPA, bankruptcy filings have once again reached pre-
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part III.A.
29. See infra notes 268-80 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV.A.1.
32. See infra Part IV.A.2.
33. See infra Part IV.A.3.
34. See infra note 375 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part IV.A.3.
36. See infra notes 383-93 and accompanying text.
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2005 levels.37 In addition, my data show that, despite some post-
BAPCPA setbacks, the overwhelming majority of Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy filers still receive their discharge from debt without any need
for appeal.38 Similarly, despite an increase in pro se filers, bank-
ruptcy has vastly lower pro se rates than similar administrative
benefits programs.39
And these programs do provide a similar benefit.40 The Chapter
7 discharge as currently used is essentially a legal redistribution
from parties that can better afford it to parties in financial distress.
There are real differences between bankruptcy and other redis-
tributive systems,41 but ultimately, the facts of these programs
matter less than the perception of them. Policymakers driven by the
moral anxieties discussed above have not always appreciated the
distinctions between bankruptcy and poverty programs. 
But bankruptcy’s relative success at avoiding the worst problems
that emerge when moral reformers try to curtail a program suggests
that there must be some major difference. This Article argues that
consumer bankruptcy’s location in the judicial branch may have
helped safeguard it from procedural sabotage.42 Factors such as paid
attorneys, high-quality judges, and the prestige-enhancing associa-
tion with its corporate cousin help separate it from welfare pro-
grams. Consumer bankruptcy attorneys contribute to the smooth
running of the system, protect their clients from overreaching, and
lobby against bankruptcy legislation that could potentially harm
consumers. Judges drawn from the top tiers of the legal profession
provide another bulwark against the type of long-term decline seen
in administrative programs. And the relationship with corporate
bankruptcy helps attract a high caliber of professionals to all areas
of the field. This combination has resulted in a judicial system that
37. Posting of Bob Lawless to Credit Slips Blog, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/
2010/06/us-bankruptcy-filings-at-same-level-as-before-2005-law.html (June 10, 2010, 14:47
CST).
38. See infra notes 391-93 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 429-36 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part IV.B.
41. These include the facts that the bankruptcy benefit is in the form of debt cancellation
rather than income and that it involves private, rather than taxpayer, funds. See infra Part
IV.B.
42. See infra Part IV.C.
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appears to accomplish its administrative functions more effectively
than many administrative programs do.
In other words, when struggling, bankrupt consumers hand over
much-needed funds to their lawyers, they are paying for more than
representation in their individual cases.43 They are paying for the
fact that much of the administrative work necessary to process their
bankruptcies will be completed by people they have hired, rather
than by government officials operating under the pressures of bu-
reaucratic disentitlement. They are paying for the continued devel-
opment of a community of lawyers and judges that wants consumer
bankruptcy to work.
This is the affordability paradox.44 Consumer bankruptcy’s
Achilles’ heel has always appeared to be the fact that too many of its
intended beneficiaries were “too poor even to go bankrupt.”45 But the
forcing of costs onto consumer debtors who were ill-equipped to bear
them may have also been responsible for a system that has re-
mained relatively accountable to their interests in the face of
intense moral anxiety about its underlying goals.
There is no perfect “solution” to this paradox, except perhaps to
look for middle ground. Consumer bankruptcy is indeed in need of
simplification reform, and this Article is not meant to minimize the
importance of that task. Rather, my goal is to underscore that
consumer bankruptcy in its current form has a number of strengths
that could be jeopardized by moving to a system that places less
emphasis on lawyers and judges. Reform efforts should focus
instead on eliminating technical barriers within the judicial
framework we have.
Part I of this Article explains the enactment of BAPCPA in terms
of bureaucratic disentitlement and the fear of abuse. Part II pro-
vides an empirical analysis of bureaucratic disentitlement in action,
using pro se cases as a measure of accessibility. Part III outlines the
history of calls for an administrative consumer bankruptcy system
and explores the reasons why it seems so appealing. Part IV argues
43. See infra Part IV.C.1.
44. In some ways, such a paradox should not be surprising. The literature on institutional
choice posits that the question of who decides is always going to be a choice between “highly
imperfect alternatives.” NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 5 (1994).
45. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 457 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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that the judicial nature of consumer bankruptcy has been crucial to
its relative success.
I. ABUSE AND REDISTRIBUTION
The story of the events leading up to the most important con-
sumer bankruptcy reform in three decades has not lacked for
attention in the legal literature. Much of the scholarship has been
devoted to demonstrating two seemingly contradictory propositions.
The first is that the reason for reform articulated most frequently
and passionately by BAPCPA’s congressional advocates was the
need to prevent relatively high-income, “can-pay” debtors from
abusing the system.46 The second is that, despite this expressed
intent, the law’s design meant that its impact would be felt well
beyond this group of suspect debtors.47
But less attention has been paid to the question of why the dis-
cussion took this precise shape. Why was the rhetoric about high-
income filers when, empirically, there appeared to be so few of
them?48 Why, if the problem was these “can-pay” debtors, was the
law virtually guaranteed to raise costs for all filers?49 Why were the
data about these two questions so ineffective at penetrating the
debates?
These questions may be phrased in specific statutory terms as
well. BAPCPA’s mechanism for screening out relatively well-off
filers was the means test: if a debtor’s income was higher than the
median for her family size in her state, she would then have to
demonstrate that her family’s debts and expenses accounted for a
large percentage of this income each month.50 Otherwise, she would
be ineligible for a quick discharge of debt in Chapter 7. Why then
46. See, e.g., Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 351-52; Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical
Examination of Access to Chapter 7 Relief by Pro Se Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 5, 6
(2010).
47. Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 385; Pardo, supra note 46, at 31.
48. Braucher, supra note 2, at 94; Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 360 fig.2.
49. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 2, at 110 (referring to “an unannounced credit industry
agenda to burden access to consumer bankruptcy”).
50. This is actually a simplification. Among other complications, many of the allowable
expense levels are set by Congress, rather than determined by the family’s actual expenses.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111, §§ 320, 327, 124 Stat. 3459,
3557 (2010).
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did the statute appear to require all debtors, even those with
incomes well below their state’s median levels, to endure the time-
consuming process of listing and documenting their every expense?51
One answer is that bankruptcy reformers were following a well-
worn path in the history of the contraction of the U.S. safety net.
American policymakers have long regarded programs with a redis-
tributive element, such as consumer bankruptcy, with a degree of
suspicion.52 When the rates of program usage rise, this suspicion can
harden into a conviction that beneficiaries must be abusing the
system. But the definition of abuse becomes confused—applying
simultaneously to specific nonneedy persons taking advantage of a
program’s generosity and to the entire growing population of
beneficiaries, who must somehow be abusing the system because
there could not possibly be such a large number of people in genuine
need. This can result in a very specific type of reform, one in which
procedures theoretically designed to ensnare only actual bad-faith
abusers exert a downward pressure on the accessibility of the entire
system.
A. Moral Ambivalence
Consumer bankruptcy liquidation is, in essence, income support.53
In theory, the “deal” provided by Chapter 7 is that the debtor will
surrender all nonexempt assets and, in exchange, will receive a
“fresh start,” free of most unsecured debt.54 But in reality, few
consumers in Chapter 7 have any nonexempt assets55 and receive
their fresh start mostly free of charge.56 The most common use of the
51. Id. § 707(b)(2)(C). The Bankruptcy Rules Committee ultimately decided that below-
median debtors did not need to complete the expense-related paperwork. Bankruptcy Form
22A Part III, line 15. The significance of this interpretation will be discussed in Part IV.C.4.
52. See infra Part I.B.
53. Mechele Dickerson has also made the argument that bankruptcy is a form of public
assistance. A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy Reform: Does the End Justify the Means?, 75
AM. BANKR. L.J. 243, 272 (2001) (“Since, however, discharging debts provides an economic
benefit to debtors, the bankruptcy system should be treated as one that provides public
assistance benefits.”).
54. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 115 (6th ed. 2009). 
55. Id. Indeed, this is the very reason why administrative bankruptcy seems so appealing.
See infra Part II.B.
56. More accurately, the only charges they pay are the ones discussed in this Article, the
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discharged debt has been to provide income and medical care during
times of personal economic crises, such as job loss, illness, or
divorce.57 These are the same reasons why people turn to welfare,
disability benefits, and veterans’ support. Social security disability
and veterans’ benefits are distinguishable from bankruptcy in that
they provide long-term financial support and have additional,
noneconomic eligibility criteria, but welfare is short term and
poverty-based.58 In some ways, the main difference in the legal
benefit provided by welfare and bankruptcy is one of asking
permission for income support to be provided in the future versus
asking forgiveness for income support used in the past.
American society is fundamentally uncomfortable with this type
of support, and bankruptcy is subject to this discomfort as much as
welfare. Professor Jay Westbrook has referred to it in the bank-
ruptcy context as the “fear of abuse.”59 The credit industry has used
the term “credit morality.”60 In addition, prominent critics of con-
sumer bankruptcy have argued that bankruptcy is no different than
other safety net programs. One of the dissenting opinions to the
Report of the 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission argued
for a debate “over whether bankruptcy relief should be means-tested
like all other programs available in the social safety net.”61 The most
prominent dissenter, Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit, has
made this argument more forcefully elsewhere: 
[I]t is not inconsistent to have means testing in bankruptcy the
same way[ ] that we means test every other part of our social
safety net in this society. Welfare, food stamps, social security,
disability, [and] medicaid all are means tested. Bankruptcy is
“procedural” charges, such as lawyer and filing fees, that support the system itself. See infra
notes 185-202 and accompanying text.
57. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 15-22 (2000).
58. Welfare recipients have always cycled in and out of the program and are currently
time-limited by law. See, e.g., Randy Albelda, Fallacies of Welfare-to-Work Policies, 577
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 67, 71 (2001).
59. Westbrook, supra note 16, at 25.
60. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
191 (2001). Skeel also notes the appearance of this theme in the welfare debates. Id.
61. Edith H. Jones & James I. Shepard, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law, in REPORT OF THE NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N
(1997), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/24commvi08.html. 
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part of the social safety net. It ought to be means tested as
well.62
A profound moral ambivalence attaches to all social safety net
programs; they are surrounded by a fear that some people are
getting something for nothing while others are working hard for
everything they receive.63 Professor Mechele Dickerson describes
this as a violation of societal norms of reciprocity.64 This anxiety is
especially pronounced in the welfare and bankruptcy contexts,
where there is no characteristic, such as disability or age, that
clearly prevents beneficiaries from supporting themselves.
Although advocates may argue that welfare and bankruptcy
claimants suffer from some combination of systemic disadvantages,
economic instability, and simple bad luck,65 there is always the
rejoinder that maybe they just did not work hard enough.66 For
welfare, the argument is: “Why should my tax dollars support this
person to stay at home when I’m working?” In bankruptcy, the fear
is less obvious because the benefit comes from credit issuers rather
than taxpayers, although this does explain the credit industry’s
hard-fought effort to establish the existence of a “bankruptcy tax.”67
But the same surface egalitarianism still hangs in the air: “Why
should they get to discharge their debts when I’m working to pay off
mine?” More recently, a different version of this question has been
particularly prominent: “Why should their mortgages be modified
when I resisted the temptation to buy or refinance during the
housing boom?”68
62. Jensen, supra note 2, at 501 (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998—Part I: Hearing
on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 15 (1998)).
63. See Dickerson, supra note 53, at 268-70.
64. Id. at 268.
65. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 15, 52.
66. For example, in the unemployment context, some economists have theorized that high
rates of joblessness can be traced to people choosing not to work. See, e.g., Posting of Casey
B. Mulligan to New York Times Economix Blog, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/
12/24/are-employers-unwilling-to-hire-or-are-workers-unwilling-to-work/ (Dec. 24, 2008, 06:30
EST). 
67. See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. (NO. 2) 77, 77, 83-
85 (2004). 
68. See, e.g., John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Matters of Principal, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2009, at A31.
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This ambivalence is what motivates the fear that program
beneficiaries have lost their sense of morality. It is also what drives
policymakers to impose procedural barriers that make program
access more difficult. Fundamental fears of abuse mean that
consumer bankruptcy may only get so simple before countervailing
forces start exerting upward pressure on the preponderance of
procedural hurdles in the system.69 
B. Stigma Crisis
Among those who fear abuse, stigma is considered the first
defense. Shame will deter potential beneficiaries from using the
safety net any more than necessary.70 When the number of claims
rises dramatically, this trend is followed by what I term a “stigma
crisis”—the emergence of the belief that the increase could only be
due to a decline in stigma.71 Researchers may respond by document-
ing the ways in which stigma is still alive and well,72 but this is
69. Professor Iain Ramsay has articulated a similar concern in the context of Canadian
proposals for immediate debt relief:
[F]rom a creditor’s viewpoint this may be perceived as potentially reducing
returns and providing little check on “undeserving” debtors who avail
themselves of the process. Creditors may interpret routinization as producing
“too many” bankruptcies and possibly as inconsistent with a moral regulation
model of bankruptcy where individuals are investigated, sorted and
rehabilitated through a process of “reintegrative shaming.” 
Iain Ramsay, Market Imperatives, Professional Discretion, and the Role of Intermediaries in
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Canadian Trustee in Bankruptcy, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 399, 402 (2000) (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION
(1988)).
70. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less
Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in
Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2006).
71. Mechele Dickerson explicitly ties this belief that bankruptcy has lost its stigma to the
attack on entitlement programs generally. Dickerson, supra note 53, at 272 (“[G]iven the
recent assault on entitlement politics, it is not surprising that critics of the Code feel that it
has caused debtors to lose their sense of personal and social responsibility and to engage in
bankruptcy opportunism.”). Though this Article makes a similar argument, it is worth noting
that the concern about the declining stigma of bankruptcy dates at least as far back as the
eighteenth century. Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in the
Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1307 n.424 (2010).
72. See, e.g., Derek S. Witte, The Bear Hug that Is Crushing Debt-Burdened Americans:
Why Overzealous Regulation of the Debt-Settlement Industry Ultimately Harms the Consumers
It Means to Protect, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 282-83 (2010) (arguing that “many individuals
who likely could qualify for post-reform individual bankruptcy still refuse to do so because of
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beside the point. A stigma crisis is not based on an examination of
shame levels, but rather on the increase in program use.73
With welfare, the rise in claims began in the early 1970s,74 and
the fear that this increase was due to shameless abuse became a
fixture of our national political culture by the time of Ronald
Reagan’s first presidential campaign.75 In the bankruptcy context,
the stigma crisis reached a boiling point in the mid-1990s, as the
number of consumer cases filed annually passed the 1 million mark
for the first time in 1996.76 Congress began considering the first of
BAPCPA’s predecessor bills the next year.77 
The alarm over a decline in stigma does not emerge because of
data about shame levels, but instead reflects  a direct response to
the increase in program usage. Alan Greenspan encapsulated this
connection with his famous statement that “personal bankruptcies
are soaring because Americans have lost their sense of shame.”78
Similarly, Judge Edith Jones testified before Congress that: “The
increase in medical expenses, divorce, and losses of jobs simply
cannot explain the increase [in bankruptcy filings] that we face
today. I think gambling is involved. I think there is a decreased
social stigma.”79 Many others have followed suit. The statements of
the social stigma attached to bankruptcy” and reviewing a study supporting this argument).
73. See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 70, at 214 (“The primary justification for this
wholesale revision of the accessibility of the consumer bankruptcy system has been the
repeated claim that the extraordinary increase in bankruptcy filings is the consequence of
declining stigma.”).
74. See, e.g., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, WHERE YOUR
MONEY GOES: THE 1994-95 GREEN BOOK 324 (Brassey’s 1994) (“Between 1970 and 1993, the
number of recipients has increased 91 percent, from 7.4 million in 1970 to 14.1 million in
1993.”).
75. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 653-55 (2009) (discussing the growth of societal distrust of welfare
recipients in the 1970s).
76. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts Bankruptcy Statistics, 1990-2002 Calendar
Year Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter and District 27, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/1990-2002_Filings_
Ending_December.pdf. Other commentators have found this moment significant. See, e.g.,
David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution,
or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 311 (1999) (“Particularly since nonbusiness filings broke
through the psychologically important one-million barrier in 1996, words like ‘crisis’ and
‘scandal’ have become increasingly familiar in all sorts of discussions about bankruptcy.”).
77. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 2, at 493.
78. Sullivan et al., supra note 70, at 216.
79. Jensen, supra note 2, at 496.
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policymakers expressing alarm over the decline in bankruptcy
stigma have been extensively documented.80 What has not been
previously noted is the large number that explicitly connect their
belief in this loss of stigma with the increase in filings.81
The tenor of the welfare debates was even harsher, with
policymakers comparing recipients to alligators and wolves,82 but
the belief in the correlation between increasing program use and
declining stigma was present. In the welfare context, this relation-
ship is mediated by dependency theory. This theory posits that the
availability of welfare reduces work incentives and creates depend-
ency, which creates a culture of poverty and decreases recipients’
ability to attain employment in the future, which, in turn, drives a
further increase in welfare use.83 Its crudest manifestation appeared
in the “don’t feed the alligators” signs that some representatives
held up during the welfare debates.84 The analogy referred to wild
alligators that become dependent on human-supplied food and
unable to fend for themselves.85 A decline in stigma is implicit in
this argument because, if potential welfare beneficiaries felt enough
shame, this shame would counteract the reduced work incentives
and stop the welfare rate from rising. The increase in welfare use
was so important to the drive to change the program that statistics
80. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 13,355 (2001) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (describing his
rejection of the popular belief in the erosion of bankruptcy stigma); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy
Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 485-88 (2006);
Sullivan et al., supra note 70, at 216; Catherine E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts & Fiction
of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 361, 411 (2003). 
81. See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means
Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s Proposals as a
Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998) (quoting Rep. George W. Gekas:
“[O]ur nation had seen an alarming increase in the number of bankruptcy filings.... The so-
called bankruptcy of convenience is a new phenomenon, borne out of the loss of stigma the
word bankruptcy once, but no longer, carried.”); Efrat, supra note 80, at 486 n.25 (quoting
Sen. Orrin Hatch: “[T]he explosion in bankruptcy filings has less to do with causes and more
to do with motivations. The stigma of bankruptcy is all but gone.”); Sullivan et al., supra note
70, at 216 (quoting Sen. William Frist: “[B]ankruptcy has become so common that it has lost
the stigma it had even a short generation ago.”); Vance & Barr, supra note 80, at 411 (quoting
Sen. Charles Grassley: “[W]e have had a general lack of shame or personal responsibility that
used to be associated with paying bills or not paying bills and the filing of bankruptcy.”).
82. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Review Essay, Ending Welfare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 471, 475 (1997).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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about it were included in the official congressional findings at the
beginning of the reform statute.86
A stigma crisis is impervious to data. In the bankruptcy field,
many researchers, most notably Professors Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook, have devoted careers to illuminating the economic
hardships debtors undergo before filing for bankruptcy.87 Thorough
empirical scholarship has also persuasively documented the strong
relationship between credit card expansion and bankruptcy filings.88
Either body of research would account for an increase in bankruptcy
use without a decline in debtor morality. In contrast, empirical
support for the proposition that stigma levels are falling has been
minimal.89 Similarly, the data on welfare use has so thoroughly
undermined dependency theory that the question of why there
exists such a large disparity between fact and policymaking has
become a major issue in the literature.90
But stigma crises do not abate in the face of data to the contrary.
Professor Margaret Howard has explained how this happened in the
debate leading up to BAPCPA: although the debate “looks to be a
disagreement about empirical facts[,] ... [i]n fact, a normative and
deeply entrenched ideological position is being clothed in empirical
rhetoric, and data will not shake it loose.”91 In many ways, the
threat of stigma crisis means that a redistributive program is
acceptable only as long as it is little used. 
The ultimate end of a stigma crisis is reform. When stigma is
perceived to be incapable of stopping abuse, the law must take its
place.
86. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 101(5), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2006)) (“The number of
individuals receiving aid to families with dependent children (in this section referred to as
‘AFDC’) has more than tripled since 1965.”).
87. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 15-22.
88. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD
MARKETS 53-67 (2006).
89. As Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook point out, much of the scholarship
attempting to document the decline in stigma is inferentially circular, in that it attempts to
demonstrate the decrease in stigma by elaborating on the increase in filings. The more
sophisticated studies then attempt to use process of elimination and attribute anything left
over to a decline in stigma. Sullivan et al., supra note 70, at 216-17 & nn.15-16.
90. Law, supra note 82, at 491-93.
91. Margaret Howard, Bankruptcy Empiricism: Lighthouse Still No Good, 17 BANKR. DEV.
J. 425, 442-43 (2001) (reviewing SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57).
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C. Ineffectiveness by Design
With stigma considered ineffective, the next step is to banish
abusers from the system. The difficulty begins with the definition of
abuse. There is a general consensus that using the social safety net
without need is abusive. But when a stigma crisis is at its height,
this lack of need tends to become a presumption.92 If an increase in
program use means that its beneficiaries have lost their sense of
shame, then the new wave of supplicants must be filing because
they are shameless, not because they are in need. In the eyes of
stigma crisis proponents, the very use of these programs becomes
almost inherently abusive.93 When the fear of abuse becomes
paramount, there are no nonabusive beneficiaries, or certainly not
as many as use these programs.
Thus, the goal of forcing abusive filers from the system trans-
forms into one of indiscriminately forcing a large number of filers
from the system. The rising tide of claims must somehow be
stopped. But when the political consensus extends only to abuse
prevention, not program-use prevention, this goal cannot be
approached directly. The result is a concept known as “bureaucratic
disentitlement.”94 
Developed in the welfare literature, bureaucratic disentitlement
posits that certain programs are ineffective not because pol-
icymakers failed to identify the best procedures but as the result of
conscious choices intended to reduce program usage.95 Policymakers
who want to eliminate a program, but who do not have the power to
do so outright, instead impose more politically feasible procedural
92. Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC.
SERV. REV. 3, 5-6 (1984).
93. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 91, at 448 (describing the logic behind the arguments for
a stricter means test under § 707(b) thusly: “Why, then, do means-testing proponents remain
dissatisfied? Possibly because they believe that § 707(b) should be applied more often than it
is. If that is the case, however, how do they know? The probable explanation is their belief
that, if § 707(b) were applied every time the facts would justify it, the bankruptcy rates would
be lower than they are.”).
94. Lipsky, supra note 92, at 5.
95. There are other reasons why policymakers might have an interest in making
bureaucracies inaccessible. Professor Morris Fiorina argues that legislators benefit from
unresponsive bureaucracies because they can then earn voter loyalty by solving the
bureaucratic problems of their constituents. MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 40-47 (2d ed. 1989).
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hurdles.96 These new hurdles are usually billed as necessary for
program integrity, a goal to which it is difficult to object, but there
is knowledge that they will screen out deserving beneficiaries as
well.97 
Bureaucratic disentitlement provides a broader theory for what
many bankruptcy commentators have already noted in the context
of BAPCPA: that the decrease in access to bankruptcy may have
been the goal of the new procedural requirements, not a side effect.
Professor James J. White has explained BAPCPA precisely this
way:
By raising the cost in hundreds of little ways, you might make
bankruptcy unpalatable to many who currently take bank-
ruptcy. Put more pejoratively, you might then be tempted to
sabotage, to fling your shoes into the bankruptcy machinery, in
the hope of slowing it down. And even if the bankruptcy organ-
ism and its friends in Congress could block overt substantive
changes in the law, they might not be able to recognize the
impact of or to resist changes that parade as benign process and
procedural improvements. Nor would you be obliged to admit
that the true reason for advocating these bureaucratic changes
was to degrade the machinery of bankruptcy; these rules could
be justified as palliatives for acknowledged ills of the system.98
Bureaucratic disentitlement maps onto bankruptcy reform in
other ways as well. It is often accompanied by a reduction in
decision-maker discretion,99 something Congress attempted with
96. Lipsky, supra note 92, at 6 (arguing that bureaucratic disentitlement is “pursued in
periods of uncertainty over and ambivalence about the social welfare contract, when policy
elites favoring a more restricted social welfare state are unable to proceed straightforwardly
to realign it”). 
97. Id. (“[Policymakers] tend to undertake their actions in the name of other political
values, such as the need for efficiency, spending reductions, fairness, or promotion of the work
ethic, and to disregard the distributional consequences.”). 
98. White, supra note 11, at 874; see also Mann, supra note 11, at 378-79.
99. Lipsky, supra note 92, at 12.
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BAPCPA.100 It also thrives in technical areas of law,101 of which
bankruptcy is certainly one.
The architects of the current bankruptcy system have imple-
mented bureaucratic disentitlement in a way that parallels its use
in poverty programs, although bankruptcy is far behind welfare in
this respect. With BAPCPA, bankruptcy began to employ some of
the mechanisms that the welfare system has used for years: an
emphasis on fraud and pressure on system actors to limit access.
The extremity of the fraud prevention measures currently em-
ployed by welfare programs highlights the extent to which bank-
ruptcy has only dipped its toe in these waters. A number of states
now require fingerprinting, home searches, and criminal record
checks as part of the initial welfare application process.102 The
stated goal of these procedures is to deter fraud by insuring that
applicants do not have other sources of income, and more specifi-
cally, that they are not receiving benefits from another state’s
system.103 But studies have shown that they cost much more to
implement than they save through fraud reduction,104 which
suggests that their real financial goal is cost savings through a
reduction in program use.
By comparison, the antifraud procedures introduced by BAPCPA
seem relatively tame. The submission of detailed tax documentation
and pay stubs is burdensome, but they are not humiliating.105 Yet
100. See, for example, the mechanized means test in current § 707(b)(2) which replaced the
“substantial abuse” test under pre-2005 § 707(b)(2). Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 356. In
some ways, Congress was facing the same choice it has when delegating authority to
administrative agencies: whether to rely on agency expertise through broad mandates or to
write detailed, rule-based statutes that constrain agency discretion. See, e.g., JOHN D. HUBER
& CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002).
101. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427,
455 (2000) (“One of Lipsky’s central insights was that disentitlement is effected outside of
public scrutiny, in the devilish details left to expert administrators and street-level
bureaucrats.”).
102. Gustafson, supra note 75, at 643, 644-45, 675 tbl.1, 697-99.
103. See id. at 675.
104. Id. at 660, 666, 677-78.
105. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the impact of the one
arguably humiliation-oriented BAPCPA requirement, credit counseling, has been less severe
than predicted, largely due to the U.S. Trustee’s willingness to approve Internet- and phone-
based counseling. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-203, BANKRUPTCY
REFORM: VALUE OF CREDIT COUNSELING REQUIREMENT NOT CLEAR 19 (2007), available at
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these measures do impose a real cost, and they were introduced
despite a lack of compelling evidence that consumer bankruptcy
fraud was a significant problem. They too were always more likely
to generate savings—in this case, to creditors—by a reduction in
bankruptcy use than by a reduction in fraud.106
The second major disentitlement mechanism BAPCPA introduced
is pressure on system actors to reduce access to bankruptcy.
Specifically, Congress wanted to limit the number of consumer
Chapter 7 cases.107 It did so with substantive procedures such as the
means test in § 707(b)(2),108 but also more subtly by altering the
incentives of consumer bankruptcy attorneys. Section 707(b)(4)(A)
permits fines against an attorney who brings a Chapter 7 case that
is deemed to be abusive under the means test.109 This may create a
conflict of interest in a situation where a client is in danger of
failing the means test, because an attorney has an incentive to steer
her into Chapter 13, even when it is not in the client’s best interests.
More generally, several provisions under § 707(b)(4) authorize
sanctions and fees against consumer bankruptcy lawyers who bring
cases under Chapter 7, but presumably do not apply to attorneys
with cases in Chapter 13, again making Chapter 13 more desirable
for attorneys, regardless of client interests.
These provisions illustrate a bankruptcy-specific point as well.
The reform’s drafters appeared to be less interested in removing
high-income filers from the entire system than from Chapter 7 in
particular. Chapter 7 evokes more fears of abuse because debtors do
not need to make any payments in exchange for their discharge.
Chapter 13, on the other hand, has always required at least three
years of repayment before a discharge is granted.110 BAPCPA’s
drafters probably would have preferred that debtors pay their
creditors outside bankruptcy rather than in Chapter 13, but
Chapter 13 repayment appears to have fallen on the correct side of
the moral line.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07203.pdf.
106. Mann, supra note 11, at 378-79.
107. See Katherine L. Swise, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Calculating a Debtor’s Projected
Monthly Income Under § 1325(b) in Light of the BAPCPA Amendments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
719, 726-27.
108. Id.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(4)(A) (2006).
110. Id. § 1322(d).
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These anti-Chapter 7 incentives, however, have largely been
ineffective. Section 707(b)(4) is rarely used,111 and I could not find a
single case in which an attorney was fined under the means-test-
specific § 707(b)(4)(A). Moreover, there were already similar, more
intractable conflicts of interest inherent in the Code, the most
important being that legal fees are payable out of the estate in
Chapter 13, but not in Chapter 7.112 The pressure on attorneys to
file Chapter 13 cases regardless of client needs was also already
intense in judicial districts that favored repayment.113 Nevertheless,
Congress’s attempt to reduce Chapter 7 use via attorney incentives
shows that it was taking a page from the bureaucratic-disentitle-
ment handbook.
Welfare provides several examples of where bureaucratic disen-
titlement may lead if used more effectively. From the early 1980s
through the present, state food stamp programs have been penal-
ized by the federal government if their administrative error rates
exceed certain levels—with the definition of error including only
improper awards of benefits, not improper denials.114 This resulted
in dramatic reductions in food stamp use.115 It also had another
effect that is particularly interesting from a disentitlement perspec-
tive: a number of states increased the frequency with which
beneficiaries had to come to the welfare office to recertify their
111. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005,
15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 294-95 (2007) (arguing that, because they are subject to Rule
9011 standards, the § 707(b)(4) sanctions provisions are less threatening to consumer
attorneys than they appear). Most of the cases that have resulted in fines levied against
attorneys under § 707(b)(4) are ones in which the attorney engaged in such extreme conduct
that sanctions might have been warranted without the new provisions. See Karen v. Kane (In
re Kane), No. 09-12470, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2167, at *4-6 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 11, 2010)
(authorizing sanctions under § 707(b)(4)(D) in case of actual fraud on the part of the debtor
attorney); Lafayette v. Collins (In re Withrow), 405 B.R. 505, 515 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2009)
(upholding sanction under § 707(b)(4) when the debtor’s schedules and amendments were
riddled with inconsistencies and inaccuracies). But see In re Trudell, 424 B.R. 786, 791-92
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (scheduling a hearing under § 707(b)(4)(D) when the debtors
received a large tax refund after their original schedules estimated that none was due).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B).
113. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 501, 546, 558 (1993).
114. David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of
Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1104-12 (2005); see also William H. Simon, Legality,
Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1212-13 (1983).
115. Super, supra note 114, at 1111.
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eligibility.116 This increased program administrative costs, but
probably decreased total costs and false positive errors by reducing
program use.117
These types of incentives have been used at the caseworker level
as well. With the rise of the bureaucratic model of welfare adminis-
tration in the 1960s and 1970s, departments began conducting time
studies of precisely how many minutes and seconds caseworkers
should spend on each task in their job description.118 This led to time
pressures that incentivized caseworkers to prioritize speed over
accuracy.119 Furthermore, workers often would be even better off if
they avoided tasks associated with ongoing cases altogether. By the
time of welfare reform in the mid-1990s, these pressures led to
frontline workers refusing to accept valid applications and misin-
forming claimants that certain benefits no longer existed.120
II. ACCESSIBILITY THROUGH A PRO SE LENS
Although the bankruptcy system has just begun to engage in
bureaucratic disentitlement, its results can already be seen.
Because consumer bankruptcy filers bear a portion of the system’s
costs in the form of attorney’s fees, the reduction in accessibility
attributable in part to bureaucratic disentitlement can be measured
in concrete terms. An increase in technical requirements means an
increase in legal fees, which means a decrease in the ability of
consumers to afford representation.121 This, in turn, creates a
number of difficulties, such as debtors delaying bankruptcy to save
up for legal fees or paying lawyers money they would otherwise use
for necessities. One of these difficulties is a growing pro se problem.
116. Id. at 1110-11.
117. Id. at 1111.
118. Simon, supra note 114, at 1218-19.
119. Id. at 1219. In 1971, Stanley and Girth proposed evaluation based on speed as one way
that an administrative consumer bankruptcy system could increase efficiency, unaware of the
disasters that this idea would precipitate in other programs. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE
GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 215 (1971).
120. See, e.g., Randal S. Jeffrey, The Importance of Due Process Protections After Welfare
Reform: Client Stories from New York City, 66 ALB. L. REV. 123, 159-60 (2002) (describing how
NYC welfare officers routinely misinformed applicants that expedited food stamps had been
eliminated by welfare reform).
121. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
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A pro se increase, particularly in the face of negative pro se
outcomes, therefore suggests that the system may have grown
unreasonably expensive in general and that all consumer bank-
ruptcy filers may be paying for unnecessarily cumbersome proce-
dures in the form of rising lawyer fees, an expense they can ill
afford. Thus, pro se data may provide an important measure of
whether consumer bankruptcy has become too technically complex.
Both the rate of unrepresented debtors and the outcomes of their
cases are important indicators of the system’s accessibility to all
debtors. 
Using data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), I
examined these two pro se measures before and after BAPCPA. I
limited this analysis to data from Chapter 7 because, as discussed
in Part I, much of the bureaucratic disentitlement strategy em-
ployed in BAPCPA appears to be aimed at driving debtors from
Chapter 7 rather than out of the system altogether.122 In addition,
as the analysis below demonstrates, pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 was
running smoothly, whereas the degree to which Chapter 13 provides
meaningful bankruptcy relief has been controversial for many
years.123
According to this analysis, the percentage of Chapter 7 debtors
whose substantive bankruptcy rights were negatively affected
by procedural technicality did, in fact, increase after BAPCPA.
Pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 had an extremely low rate of pro se cases,
122. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text. Chapter 13 filers have, of course, been
subject to increased procedural hurdles as well. But Chapter 13 was technically complex even
before BAPCPA, and the redistributive/bureaucratic disentitlement analysis I am using does
not apply to repayment bankruptcy in the same way.
123. Only a minority of those who file under Chapter 13 ever receive their discharge. See
Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter
13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476, 479 (2006) (finding a discharge rate of only 33 percent
among Chapter 13 debtors who filed in seven districts in 1994). In addition, wide geographic
variations in the use of Chapter 13 and in the amount of repayment proposed have raised
concerns about whether local legal norms have been trumping debtors’ ability to choose
Chapter 13 in accordance with their own interests and with the Code. See, e.g., Jean
Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need for Simplification and a
Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1298 n.12, 1320 (2006); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Culture: Twenty Years of
Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 833, 864
(1994). These trends have led one commentator to propose abolishing Chapter 13 altogether.
See generally William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85
(1989).
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meaning that bankruptcy attorneys were affordable at this point. In
addition, every debtor who did file pro se successfully received a
discharge. The results of both measures changed after 2005. The
percentage of pro se cases rose statistically significantly, especially
among lower-income debtors, while the percentage of these cases
ending with a discharge of debt declined. And the reasons for these
failures are telling. The entire post-BAPCPA increase in negative
pro se outcomes is attributable to cases in which the debtors were
alleged to have made technical errors.
Thus, pro se Chapter 7 debtors after BAPCPA encountered disen-
titlement through procedural hurdles twice: first in the form of
unaffordable attorneys and, second, more directly through technical
requirements they could not meet on their own. But the success of
pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 is notable as well. It demonstrates that the
affordability problem is not a result of a lawyer-based system per se,
but rather of its specific implementation. 
A. Methodology
The data presented below are from the 2001 and 2007 iterations
of the CBP. The CBP has been the leading national study of con-
sumer bankruptcy for nearly thirty years.124 Once a decade, or more
frequently when there are major legislative changes, CBP research-
ers gather data on consumer debtors.125 This Article uses data
collected from written questionnaires and bankruptcy court records
in 2001 and 2007.126
The 2001 CBP generated a sample of 1250 consumer bankruptcy
filers from five U.S. judicial districts, which were chosen to reflect
a diverse array of bankruptcy characteristics.127 Participants were
recruited to complete written questionnaires in person when they
arrived at bankruptcy court for their meeting with trustees and
creditors.128 This written survey collected demographic data not
124. See Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 387, 391.
125. Id.
126. For a discussion of these two studies, see id. at 389-97.
127. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 266 (explaining the district selection process for the
1991 CBP); Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 389-90 (stating that the 2001 CBP used the same
districts as the 1991 CBP, except for the substitution of the Northern District of Texas for the
Western District of Texas).
128. Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 389.
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available from court records and solicited information about
participants’ credit usage and recent economic history.129 Research-
ers then coded data from participants’ court records, including
financial information and developments in their bankruptcy
cases.130
The 2007 CBP was a national,131 systematic sample of consumer
bankruptcy filers, the first of its kind.132 Data were collected from
2438 debtors.133 Participants were selected from the population of
consumers who filed bankruptcy during a five-week period in
February and March of 2007.134 Researchers solicited respondents
by mail, asking for their participation in the written questionnaire,
and obtained a response rate of 50.6 percent.135 The written survey
was an expanded version of the instrument used in 2001 and con-
tained many identical questions. Researchers then coded detailed
financial and legal information from participants’ bankruptcy court
records.136 Cross-checks were done to insure coder accuracy.137
Researchers also tested for response bias and found few significant
demographic or financial differences between the study respondents
and those who did not return questionnaires.138 Principal investiga-
tors from the 2007 CBP have published a detailed account of the
study’s history and methodology in an article presenting the first
findings from the 2007 data.139
129. Id. at 390.
130. See id. at 389-91.
131. Because the 2001 CBP contains data from five judicial districts, analysis that
compares findings from the two years uses a geographic subset of the 2007 data.
132. The author was part of a team of principal investigators who conducted this study.
The other researchers were David U. Himmelstein, Melissa Jacoby, Robert Lawless,
Katherine Porter, John Pottow, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, and Steffie Woolhandler.
Teresa Sullivan also provided guidance. For a detailed description of the 2007 CBP
methodology, see Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 391-97.
133. Id. at 393. Additional participants were included in an oversample of elderly
bankruptcy filers. Id. at 391. Those observations, however, are not included in this analysis.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 392.
136. See id.
137. The error rate was 0.2 percent for questionnaire coding and 0.8 percent for the court
records. Id. at 394-96.
138. The only significant difference between the two groups in the study was that Chapter
7 filers were slightly overrepresented as compared to Chapter 13 debtors. This discrepancy
is not relevant to the current Article, which relies on only Chapter 7 data.
139. Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 387-98 app. I. 
2011] THE AFFORDABILITY PARADOX 1959
B. Canaries in an Inaccessibility Coal Mine
When the bureaucracy in a consumer legal system reaches an
unsustainable level, one of the first concrete consequences will be a
pro se problem. We should expect pro se cases to occur more
frequently as the fees of the lawyers who navigate this thicket of
technicality rise. These pro se filers should also be less successful,
and a major contributing factor to this failure should be their
entanglement in technicalities unrelated to substantive bankruptcy
issues. This is precisely what appears to have occurred in the wake
of BAPCPA.
1. The Rate of Pro Se Bankruptcies
Changes in the pro se rate over time tend to support the theory
that the procedural hurdles added by BAPCPA are making Chapter
7 bankruptcy too technical.140 There is little question that BAPCPA
increased the technical requirements of consumer bankruptcy.
Although access to Chapter 7 was substantively restricted by the
means test, BAPCPA included many provisions unrelated to a
debtor’s means that made it more technically challenging. Debtors
must complete more paperwork and must document the information
contained in that paperwork more fully.141 BAPCPA added deadlines
throughout the consumer provisions of the Code and made dismissal
mandatory when they were not met.142 Mandatory dismissal was
added as a sanction for other technical mistakes as well.143
During the debates over BAPCPA, many commentators predicted
that the increase in technical formality and burdens on lawyers144
would result in increased legal fees.145 This would lead to, among
140. See infra tbl.1.
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006). Although some of this paperwork does relate to the debtor’s
means, some is duplicative (requiring pay stubs in § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and tax returns in §
521(e)(2)(A)(i)), and some is not means-related (expenses apparently required for all debtors
under § 521(a)(1)(A)(II)).
142. See, e.g., id. § 521(i).
143. See, e.g., id. § 521(j).
144. BAPCPA also placed new burdens directly on debtor’s lawyers. See, e.g., id. §§ 526-28.
These requirements probably contributed to the increase in legal fees, and thus to the number
of pro se cases, but should not have affected the outcome of pro se cases.
145. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 10, at 408.
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other problems,146 an increase in consumers filing pro se. The pre-
dicted increase in lawyers’ fees has taken place. A major govern-
ment study found that Chapter 7 attorneys’ fees increased by 51
percent between early 2005 and 2007, from a mean of $712 to
$1,078.147
A similar rise in pro se filings has occurred. The percentage of
Chapter 7 debtors who filed pro se rose significantly between 2001
and 2007.148 According to CBP data, the rate of debtors who filed for
bankruptcy pro se in 2007 was 3.6 percent.149 Methodological con-
siderations, however, make it improper to compare this 3.6 percent
figure directly to the pro se rate found in 2001. Because the 2001
and 2007 CBP drew their samples differently, adjustments must be
made.150 The 2007 CBP was a national sample, whereas the 2001
CBP collected data from five judicial districts.151 This makes it nec-
essary to limit the 2007 data to those five districts when comparing
the two years. The 2007 Chapter 7 pro se rate for the five districts
surveyed in 2001 was 5.3 percent. This is an increase of more than
250 percent from 2001, when 2 percent of debtors in the CBP
sample were unrepresented.152
146. There are two other major negative results. The first is that a large portion of
consumer filers delay bankruptcy over a period of several months because they need that time
to save up for their lawyers’ fees. See Mann & Porter, supra note 22, at 323-24. Second, some
debtors undoubtedly give up and do not file. Id. at 290. Although it is impossible to quantify
the number of debtors who choose not to file for bankruptcy due to its costs, id. at 301-02,
scholars have used changes in filing rates across amendments to the Bankruptcy Code to
argue that this population may be quite large, Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 351. Together
with filing pro se, these three possibilities represent the primary options faced by individuals
who want to file for bankruptcy but cannot afford it. We may think of them as the triad of
problems we should expect to arise when lawyers are unaffordable. 
147. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT OF 2005, at 22 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf [hereinafter
GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT].
148. See infra tbl.1.
149. Out of a sample of 1611 Chapter 7 debtors in 2007, 58 filed pro se.
150. See Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 389-91.
151. Those five districts were Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Central District of
California, Northern District of Texas, Northern District of Illinois, and Middle District of
Tennessee. Id. at 388-90.
152. See infra tbl.1.
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Table 1. Rate of Chapter 7 Pro Se Filings, 2007 Five-District
Subsample and 2001 Sample
Represented Pro Se Percent Pro Se Total
2007 177 10 5.3 187
2001 698 14 2.0 712
Difference between years significant at p<.05 using Fisher exact.
One limitation of this analysis is the possibility of response bias.
It could be the case that fewer pro se filers responded to the CBP
survey in both years. Pro se filers have lower incomes and are less
likely to be homeowners.153 This might mean that they move more
often and therefore were less likely to have received the 2007
questionnaire, which was sent by mail. Pro se debtors may also be
more intimidated when they arrive at the courthouse. This may
have made them less likely to complete a questionnaire in 2001,
when debtors were approached in person in court. Either possibility
would depress the CBP pro se rates in ways that are difficult to
predict. 
This concern is alleviated somewhat for the 2007 sample by a
General Accounting Office (GAO) study.154 GAO used a sample
generated by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AOUSC).
The data was drawn directly from court records without the need for
debtor consent and so avoids any potential response bias.155 GAO
found a 2007 Chapter 7 pro se rate of 5.9 percent.156 This is quite
similar to the CBP Chapter 7 rate of 5.96 percent, which emerges
after certain other factors discussed below are accounted for. 
In addition to the CBP, there are three other empirical analyses
that provide data on the change in the Chapter 7 pro se rate since
BAPCPA,157 one of which is the GAO report. These studies, however,
153. See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
154. See GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT, supra note 147.
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id. at 27.
157. See supra notes 46, 147 and accompanying text; see also infra note 168 and
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have drawbacks that limit their applicability to this question.
Although they found that the rate of pro se filers in Chapter 7
declined after BAPCPA, two of them have methodological features
that make them less useful than the CBP on this point. In addition,
the role of nonlawyer bankruptcy petition preparers further
muddies the waters. Thus, despite the results of these studies, the
best estimate of changes in the national rate of pro se filings is
likely the CBP’s.
The first study is the GAO report discussed above, which
BAPCPA itself required GAO to complete.158 Congress directed GAO
to study the costs of the new bankruptcy law, and GAO’s report
includes an analysis of pro se cases as one of these potential costs.159
Although the GAO study contributes significantly to the literature
on bankruptcy reform’s costs, the authors of the study were unable
to obtain comparable pre- and post-BAPCPA data sets with which
to examine the pro se rate.160
GAO found that the percentage of pro se filers in Chapter 7
declined from 11 percent in early 2005, before BAPCPA’s passage,
to 5.9 percent in 2007.161 However, the 2007 figure was generated by
the AOUSC,162 whereas GAO drew its own sample for the 2005
figures.163 Because the two studies used different parameters for
selecting their subjects, it is difficult to assess the comparability of
their results.164
The second study that furnishes information on the pro se rate
before and after BAPCPA is Professor Rafael Pardo’s census of
accompanying text.
158. GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT, supra note 147, at 1.
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id. at 42-44.
161. Id. at 4. The 2005 sample included data from February and March, so it avoided most
of the dramatic increase in filings that occurred in the wake of BAPCPA’s passage in April of
2005. Id. at 8. But BAPCPA was debated intensively during the months prior to its passage,
and experts were predicting its imminent passage, so some filers may have been influenced
before April.
162. Id. at 27.
163. Id. at 43-44.
164. For example, the AOUSC’s data included business cases, which accounted for 4
percent of the observations, id. at 27 n.44, whereas GAO had no business cases in its 2005
sample, id. at 43 tbl.5. Further differences may exist, but it is impossible to be sure because
the GAO Report does not provide information on how the AOUSC data was collected. The
GAO’s findings on the increase in legal fees do not suffer from this same limitation. In that
case, GAO drew both samples itself. Id. at 22.
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Chapter 7 debtors who filed in the Western District of Washington
from 2003 through 2007.165 Professor Pardo was primarily examin-
ing a different question, but he noted that 18 percent of Chapter 7
debtors in his study filed pro se before BAPCPA, compared to 13
percent afterwards.166 However, for reasons discussed below, the
particular measure he used to capture the pro se rate varies
considerably by geographic area,167 so this single-district comparison
can probably not be generalized nationally.
The third data set comes from a short report published by the
U.S. Trustee Program (USTP). The study uses USTP data to find
that the Chapter 7 pro se rate declined by approximately 2 percent
(from a little under 8 percent to just under 6 percent) between 2004
and 2008.168 This report does not explain its methodology, but it
does not appear to have the limits of the other two, except with
respect to the preparer issue, discussed next.
Another difficulty in reconciling studies is created by bankruptcy
petition preparers. Instead of hiring a lawyer or filing entirely on
their own, many debtors use paid, nonlawyer petition preparers to
help them complete their bankruptcy paperwork.169 These are front-
end services that aid debtors with the initial paperwork and then
have no further involvement in the case.170 The quality of their work
has been questioned in the bankruptcy community, with some
165. See Pardo, supra note 46.
166. Id. at 18 n.60. 
167. The Clerk’s Office for the Western District of Washington did not identify preparer
cases in the data set it provided to Professor Pardo, so his pro se rate most likely includes
these cases. E-mail from Rafael I. Pardo, Professor of Law, Univ. of Wash. School of Law, to
Angela Littwin, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Tex. School of Law (Aug. 30, 2010, 06:39
CST) (on file with author). And as discussed below, use of petition preparers varies widely
across judicial districts. See infra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
168. Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Data Show Trends in Post-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Filings,
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/2008/abi_200808.pdf (table entitled
“Percentage of Cases Filed Pro se by Quarter January-March 2008”). Although this report
uses data from the AOUSC and the USTP, id. at 1 n.1, it appears that the data for this table
is from the USTP, as it excludes North Carolina and Alabama, which are not covered by this
program. See About the United States Trustee Program & Bankruptcy, http://www.justice.gov/
ust/eo/ust_org/about_ustp.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
169. GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT, supra note 147, at 28.
170. See id. at 28 n.46.
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arguing that they often do debtors more harm than good.171 The
CBP’s findings on their effectiveness will be discussed below.172
Petition preparers make calculating the pro se rate difficult for
two primary reasons. First, they are geographically concentrated,
making their distribution among bankruptcy districts uneven.173
This makes it difficult to obtain a reliable preparer rate without a
national sample.174 
Second, it is not always clear whether a case is pro se or preparer
filed. Preparers are supposed to sign petitions they handle,175 but
they may frequently neglect to do so.176 This means that any given
pro se case may have, in fact, been filed by a petition preparer,
making it extremely difficult to measure the nonpreparer pro se
rate. The other studies handled this issue by grouping pro se and
preparer bankruptcies together.177 Thus, the GAO rate of 5.9 percent
includes both pro se and preparer cases.178 This is close to the 5.96
percent combined rate found by the CBP, providing some cross-
verification for both studies.179 Professor Pardo’s rate is much
higher, which may be due to the concentration of petition preparers
in the district he studied.180
171. See Philip Tedesco, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 100 n.63
(2010) (citing A. Jay Cristol, The Nonlawyer Provider of Bankruptcy Legal Services: Angel or
Vulture?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 353, 358 (1994)); Mary M. Testerman, Bankruptcy
Paralegal Regulation and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Legitimate Legal Assistance
Options for the Pro Se Bankruptcy Debtor, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 37, 37 (1996).
172. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
173. For example, in the 2007 CBP, preparer cases were concentrated within a minority
of judicial districts. More than 20 percent of cases in the District of Arizona were filed by
preparers, whereas no other district had more than 10 percent. Most districts had no preparer
cases at all. See also Braucher, supra note 10, at 416-17 (noting the perils of using document
preparers, as well as commenting on California’s high rate of pro se filings). 
174. This is why I do not report any preparer data from the 2001 CBP. Its five-district
sample makes these figures undependable.
175. See Official Bankruptcy Form B19 (Official Form 19) (2007), available at
http://www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/forms/Official_Bankruptcy_forms/Form_19_1207.pdf.
176. Telephone Interview with Mary Fox, Pro Se Bankruptcy Law Clerk, E. Dist. of N.Y.
(Dec. 15, 2009); Telephone Interview with Henry Sommer, Bankruptcy Attorney (Dec. 7,
2010).
177. GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT, supra note 147, at 28; E-mail from Pardo, supra note 167.
178. GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT, supra note 147, at 27-28.
179. CBP (2007).
180. The Western District of Washington was one of only five judicial districts in the 2007
CBP where three or more cases were filed by petition preparers, suggesting that preparer
cases may be overrepresented in that court. The majority of the districts studied had no
preparer cases. 
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Although combining the pro se and preparer cases alleviates one
issue, it raises another. There are, in fact, major differences between
the two groups. As will be discussed later in this Section, in the
2007 CBP, preparer cases were different demographically and in
outcome from both pro se and lawyer cases.181 In particular, debtors
who used petition preparers had much better case outcomes than
pro se debtors,182 suggesting that the two groups face distinct bank-
ruptcy barriers. The existence of statistically significant differences
also suggests that the CBP’s pro se data is uncontaminated enough
by preparer-filed bankruptcies to allow useful analysis of the two
groups. The overall conclusion is that, although the petition-
preparer issue means that none of the studies can perfectly capture
changes in the pro se rate after bankruptcy reform, the CBP’s
finding of a significant increase is probably reliable.183
But before naming procedural complexity as a major correlate
with the increase in pro se cases, we need to assess the relationship
between the increase in legal prices associated with it and the pro
se trend. Although causation cannot be inferred with certainty from
the available data, income is clearly tied to the likelihood of
representation by an attorney. The relationship between income and
pro se status suggests that the rising cost of lawyers is at least
partially contributing to the increase in pro se cases.
Data from the 2007 CBP show that unrepresented debtors had
significantly lower incomes at the time of bankruptcy.184 This
suggests that cost played a major role in the decision of whether to
hire a bankruptcy lawyer.185 According to CBP data, income was a
statistically significant predictor of whether a debtor hired a lawyer,
even when controlling for other potentially relevant factors such as
181. See infra tbls.3a, 4.
182. See infra tbls.3a, 4.
183. Further support comes from the findings of more recent preliminary analysis, which
suggests that the pro se trend has increased since 2007. See Posting of Bob Lawless to Credit
Slips Blog, supra note 37 (finding a combined pro se and preparer rate of 10.1 percent in a
national random sample of Chapter 7 filers from July and August 2010). 
184. See infra tbl.2.
185. The additional costs BAPCPA imposed on consumer debtors would augment the effect
of increases in legal fees. In Chapter 7, filing fees increased from $155 to $245. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1930(a)(1)(A) (2006). Consumers were also required to receive credit counseling and
financial education. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(h), 727(a)(11). The GAO study found these to cost an
average of $100 per consumer in 2007. GAO DOLLAR COSTS REPORT, supra note 147, at 31.
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education, race and ethnicity, age, homeownership, prior bankrupt-
cies, assets, and bankruptcy chapter.186
The more income a filer had, the more likely she was to hire a
lawyer.187 Table 2 shows the results of logistic regression models
that estimate the odds of a debtor filing for bankruptcy with a
lawyer.188 Debtors using preparers and filing pro se were grouped
together for purposes of this regression.189 The results are shown as
odds ratios, which compare the probabilities of certain events
occurring under a given set of circumstances.190 For example, Table
2 shows that the odds of using lawyers for African American debtors
were about 60 percent less than the odds for white debtors.191 The
186. See infra tbl.2. Four other factors were statistically significant. The first two, home
ownership and education, are discussed in a separate piece about this data. Angela Littwin,
The Do-It-Yourself Mirage: Complexity in the Bankruptcy System, in BROKE: HOW DEBT
BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS (Katherine Porter, ed.) (forthcoming 2011). The third factor
was unencumbered assets, which is discussed later in this Article. The final significant factor
was race. Even when controlling for the other relevant factors, the odds of African American
households being represented were approximately 50 percent less than households of other
races. See infra tbl.2. I ran the same regression with Asian American, Hispanic, and multi-
racial/multi-ethnic households, but none of these results were significant. See infra tbl.2. The
potential causes of this gap are as varied as they are familiar. The myriad possibilities include
discrimination, geographic disparities in lawyer advertising, social isolation, and distrust of
the legal system. Understanding which, if any, of these factors is contributing to the
relationship between race and pro se filings would require an in-depth analysis that is beyond
the scope of these data.
187. See infra tbl.2.
188. I also ran probit regressions for this regression as well as the one in Table 3b. Both
analyses produced similar results as those reported in this Article. The same variables were
significant in the same directions, and the odds ratios were quite similar.
189. I originally ran a multinomial regression with all three outcomes (lawyer, preparer,
and pro se). The sample size of the preparer category was so small that the result did not
show any difference. Both the lawyer and pro se outcomes were essential to my research
question, so I had to decide how to handle the preparer cases. Three options were possible:
(1) add the preparer cases to the lawyer cases; (2) add the preparer cases to the pro se cases;
or (3) drop the preparer cases from this analysis. Fortunately, all three options yielded
functionally equivalent results. In each case, the same variables were statistically significant
in the same direction. The only differences were the size of the effect and, to a lesser extent,
the degree of statistical significance. The alternate regressions are available upon request.
190. See John Kraemer, Note, An Empirical Examination of the Factors Associated with the
Commutation of State Death Row Prisoners’ Sentences Between 1986 and 2005, 45 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1389, 1401 (2008) (explaining odds ratios).
191. When an odds ratio is less than 1, the percentage is obtained by subtracting the result
from 1. So, in Table 2, the odds of hiring a lawyer among non-Hispanic black filers would be
61.8 percent less than among non-Hispanic white filers in the model with demographic
variables. The odds ratio decreased when I added bankruptcy variables as well. See infra
tbl.2.
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precise relationship between legal representation and income is
more difficult to state in plain English, but a family that earned
$3,000 per month would be significantly more likely to hire a lawyer
than a family that earned $2,000, although the relationship is not
linear.192 Three models are presented to show more precisely the
relationship between income and the other factors. The first model
is a bi-variate analysis that includes only income and legal repre-
sentation. The second model adds controls for basic demographic
factors like race and ethnicity, education, and age. The third model
includes the demographic variables and also adds the bankruptcy-
specific variables of home ownership, prior bankruptcy, and whether
the household had more than minimal unencumbered assets at the
time of bankruptcy.
Table 2. Factors Correlated with Having Legal Representa-
tion: 2007 Chapter 7 Data (Expressed as Odds Ratios) 
Bi-variate
Model
Model with
Demographic
Variables
Model with 
Demographic and
Bankruptcy 
Variables
lnIncome
(log of income)
1.170a
(0.058)
1.168a
(0.059)
1.139b
(0.061)
Non-Hispanic
White
(reference 
category)
Non-Hispanic
Black
0.382a
(0.104)
0.442a
(0.122)
Other Races and
Ethnicities
0.824
(0.232)
0.944
(-0.271)
192. Because the distribution on incomes in this sample does not form a normal curve, it
was necessary to convert those values into logs. See infra tbl.2.
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No College
(reference 
category)
Some College 0.801
(0.213)
0.765
(0.206)
College Degree 0.722
(0.231)
0.629
(0.204)
Household Age 1.006(0.009)
1.001
(0.008)
Homeownership 1.973(1.290)
Prior Bankruptcy 1.088(0.541)
Unencumbered
Assets
(whether the
debtor had at least
$1,000 more in 
assets than in 
secured debt)
1.764b
(0.408)
Observations 1611 1611 1611
Log Likelihood -357.851 -350.472 -343.736
Pseudo R^2 0.0164 0.0367 0.0635
   a: p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: p<0.10
A flag variable was added in the model for missing values. None of
the differences between missing values and nonmissing values were
statistically significant.193
Source: 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
193
There are other financial variables important in assessing a
debtor’s financial health, but measures such as assets and debt
loads are less likely to be indicative of a debtor’s ability to obtain
193. For missing information in the independent variables, I used the mean imputation or
the mode imputation method. Whenever I used missing imputation, I created a dummy
variable for missing in each variable and added them in the model. Therefore I was able to
adjust the missing effect in the model.
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money for a lawyer. Consumers in bankruptcy tend to have very few
assets besides their homes.194 Most filers are so indebted by the time
they reach bankruptcy that borrowing more against their homes—or
any other assets, for that matter—would rarely be an option.195 In
addition, another recent study suggests that two of the main ways
debtors obtain the money to hire bankruptcy lawyers include saving
over the course of several months and using immediate cash
infusions such as tax refunds and paychecks.196 A debtor’s ability to
use either of these approaches is highly dependent on her income.
A substantial minority of debtors, however, did have nonminimal
assets, and the presence of assets was a statistically significant
factor in the decision to hire a lawyer. The odds of using a lawyer
were approximately 1.8 times greater for debtors with at least
$1,000 in unencumbered assets than for those without.197 This
suggests that having some assets weighed in favor of hiring a
lawyer, perhaps because those assets could be used to pay for an
attorney or because having assets gave a debtor more to lose in a
pro se bankruptcy. 
Not surprisingly, pro se debtors were, in fact, worse off along
assets-related measures. They had many fewer assets upon arrival
in bankruptcy. The median asset value for pro se and preparer
debtors in Chapter 7 was $7,927, compared to $24,000 for debtors
with lawyers.198 Both groups had negative net worth figures. Pro se
and preparer debtors had a median net worth of negative $32,607,
compared to the slightly more modest negative $30,732 for repre-
194. See Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 367.
195. The median net worth in the 2007 sample was negative $24,634, meaning that the
median consumer’s debts were $24,634 higher than her assets. Id. at 405. 
196. Mann & Porter, supra note 22, at 319-24. 
197. I defined “unencumbered assets” to mean the value of assets a debtor had beyond her
level of secured debt. For example, if a debtor had $10,000 worth of assets and $9,000 worth
of secured debt, she would have $1,000 of “unencumbered assets” under this calculation. This
would be $1,000 of value that she could theoretically liquidate and use to pay a lawyer. I chose
$1,000 as the cut-off because it was a convenient point near the current median Chapter 7
attorney fee of $1,078. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. I recognize that the value
of a debtor's assets and the level of her secured debt do not directly align in the sense that
debtors do not report the amount of their unencumbered assets on their petitions. But this
variable should still serve as a rough proxy for the ability to use assets to pay for counsel. I
ran the regression in Table 2 with several variations of the assets variables and obtained
similar results for all robust versions of it.
198. CBP (2007).
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sented debtors. The one area in which unrepresented debtors
appeared to be in better shape was in the ratio of debt to income,
which measures how long it would take a debtor to pay off her debts
if she used all her income to do so. For both types of debtors, the
median was more than three years, but it was slightly higher for
represented debtors.199 This probably does not mean that pro se
debtors are meaningfully better off in this way. It is most likely a
result of the fact that represented debtors may be more likely to be
homeowners and therefore have higher levels of secured debt.200
Thus, there appears to be a correlation between pro se status and
particularly severe financial limitations, suggesting that there is a
relationship between the increase in legal fees and the rise in pro se
filings that simultaneously occurred. There are other possibilities,
however. The rate of pro se filings may have increased because of
other, nondisentitlement features of BAPCPA. For example,
BAPCPA added a provision allowing fee waivers for the first time.201
This may have encouraged debtors who could afford neither
attorney fees nor filing fees to consider bankruptcy. There is
empirical support for this possibility. In a study using an enlarged
version of the 2007 CBP data, researcher Phil Tedesco found that
71.2 percent of pro se filers applied for a fee waiver.202 It is impossi-
ble to know whether they would have filed for bankruptcy anyway.
It could be the case that pro se filers learned of the fee waiver only
after deciding to file, for example from the clerk’s office. But the
availability of the fee waiver certainly could have contributed to the
rise in pro se filings. 
2. The Likelihood of Success
An increase in pro se filings is not a negative event if a system
handles these cases well. But when pro se filers are disproportion-
ately subject to negative outcomes, it becomes a matter for concern.
199. Represented debtors had a median debt-to-income ratio of 3.36, whereas the median
for pro se and preparer debtors was 3.01.
200. Indeed, secured debt-to-income ratios were higher for represented debtors (median
.56) than for unrepresented debtors (median .29).
201. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1930(f) (West Supp. 2010).
202. Tedesco, supra note 171, at 92 fig.4. Tedesco supplemented the 2007 CBP data with
an additional sample drawn from the larger CBP database of all cases filed during February
and March 2007. Id. at 86 n.32.
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Pre-2005 Chapter 7 was remarkably successful in its handling of
pro se cases. Not a single one in the 2001 CBP database was
dismissed. Chapter 7 appears to have declined in this respect by
2007, when pro se debtors fared significantly worse than their
represented counterparts. These findings are even more troubling
when one considers the reasons pro se debtors were doing so badly.
Technical errors played a disproportionately large role in 2007 pro
se dismissals, which means that many pro se cases are not being
heard on the merits. 
a. A Possible Rise in Pro Se Failures over Time 
The goal for most debtors declaring bankruptcy in Chapter 7 is to
obtain a discharge of debt.203 Once the court grants this discharge,
the debtor is no longer legally responsible for most previously
acquired unsecured debt. Thus, a debtor’s ability to obtain this
discharge is a good measure of success for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
case.
If a Chapter 7 debtor received a discharge of debt, I coded it as a
positive outcome. If, on the other hand, the case was dismissed
without a discharge or converted to a Chapter 13, that counted as
a negative result.204 These negative outcomes might occur for either
substantive reasons (for example, failing the means test) or
procedural ones (for example, failing to file the proper documenta-
tion), although as I discuss below,205 procedural dismissals are much
more likely.
Pre-2005 Chapter 7 was successful in this respect.206 There was
no significant difference between the outcomes of pro se and rep-
resented debtors. All pro se debtors were able to obtain a discharge.
By 2007, Chapter 7 had changed. In that year, 17.6 percent of
203. As discussed below, some debtors may file for the benefit of the automatic stay, which
halts all collections processes during the bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). These types
of filings, however, are less likely in Chapter 7, because the main reason for automatic-stay-
driven bankruptcies is to halt foreclosures on assets, and Chapter 7 does not protect assets. 
204. It is important to note that there are other possible negative outcomes that fall short
of dismissal. Although these measures are beyond the scope of the current Article, pro se
debtors may be more likely to lose collateral due to procedural mistakes or to reaffirm debts
when not in their best interests.
205. See infra Part II.C.
206. See infra tbl.3a.
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unrepresented debtors had their cases dismissed or converted. In
contrast, only 1.9 percent of debtors with lawyers met this fate—a
large and statistically significant difference. Debtors with petition
preparers fared better than pro se debtors but not as well as those
with legal representation. Their dismissal rate was 5.3 percent.
A regression analysis showed that these results were still sig-
nificant when controlling for education, race and ethnicity, income,
age, homeownership, prior bankruptcy, whether the debtor had any
nonminimal unencumbered assets at the time of filing, and the
completeness of the bankruptcy petition.207 In the regression,
represented debtors were almost ten times more likely to receive a
discharge than their pro se counterparts when controlling for these
other factors. The difference between debtors who used petition
preparers and their pro se counterparts, however, was not statisti-
cally significant.
The only other interesting variable was one that measured
whether the debtor had filled out any of the required forms and
schedules. The purpose of this variable was to examine the
possibility that pro se debtors were faring badly because they
were filing “skeleton petitions,” bankruptcy filings with none of the
supporting documentation. The main reason to do this is to take
advantage of the automatic stay, which halts all collection activity
at the moment of filing.208 This variable was not statistically
significant, suggesting that it is unlikely to be driving the pro se
trend.209
Finally, there may always be additional unobservable factors for
which I cannot control. But this analysis suggests that filing pro se
dramatically escalates the chance that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy will
not provide a person with debt relief.
207. See infra tbl.3b.
208. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
209. The skeleton petition variable was significant in other versions of this regression. Not
surprisingly, failure to complete any documentation was associated with negative outcomes.
However, only 9 cases out of all 1602 in Chapter 7 met this criterion, so it probably was not
a meaningful factor in the outcome results.
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Table 3a. Representation and Case Outcomes in Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy in 2001 and 2007
2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
Type of 
Representation
Positive
Outcome
Negative
Outcome
Percent
Negative
Outcome
Total
Lawyer 447 3 0.7 450
Pro Se 13 0 0 13
Total 460 3 0.6 463
Difference between lawyer and pro se outcomes was not statistically
significant.
2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
Type of 
Representation
Positive
Outcome
Negative
Outcome
Percent
Negative
Outcome
Total
Lawyer 1479 28 1.9 1507
Petition 
Preparer 36 2 5.3 38
Pro Se 47 10 17.6 57
Total 1562 40 2.5 1602
Difference between lawyer and pro se outcomes was significant at
p<.05 using Fisher exact. Differences between preparer and other
conditions were not statistically significant.
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Table 3b. Odds of Positive Outcome in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
(Logistic Regression)
Bi-variate
Model
Model with
Demographic
Variables
Model with
Demographic
and 
Bankruptcy
Variables
Pro Se
(reference 
category)
Petition Preparer 3.830c
(3.085)
2.900
(2.378)
2.414
(2.006)
Lawyer 11.239a
(4.463)
8.472a
(3.582)
9.507a
(4.232)
Non-Hispanic
White
(reference 
category)
Non-Hispanic
Black
0.566
(0.247)
0.512
(0.230)
Other Races and
Ethnicities
0.854
(0.360)
0.830
(0.358)
No College
(reference 
category)
Some College 0.702
(0.296)
0.675
(0.294)
College Degree 0.427c
(0.195)
0.415c
(0.197)
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lnIncome
(log of income)
1.063
(0.093)
1.095
(0.097)
Household Age 1.000
(0.013)
1.004
(0.014)
Homeownership 1.265
(1.012)
Prior Bankruptcy 0.558
(0.374)
Unencumbered
Assets
(whether the
debtor had at least
$1,000 more in
assets than in se-
cured debt)
1.078
(0.407)
All Forms and
Schedules 
Missing 
(Reference 
category)
Some or All Forms 
Completed
11142265.883
(1.127e+10)
Observations 1602 1602 1602
Log Likelihood -173.643 -168.272 -163.932
Pseudo R^2 0.0719 0.1006 0.1292
a: p<0.01, b: p<0.05, c: p<0.10
Interaction between homeowner and chapter is not statistically
significant.
A flag variable was added in the model for missing values. None of
the differences between missing values and nonmissing values were
statistically significant.210
Source: 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
210
210. For the treatment of missing information in the independent variables, see supra note
193.
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b. Causation and Losing on Technicalities
The higher failure rate among pro se debtors is not necessarily
troubling in and of itself. Although the above data suggest a strong
correlation between pro se status and negative bankruptcy out-
comes, they cannot show causation, and there are explanations that
do not implicate the bankruptcy system’s treatment of these cases.
For example, there could be non-BAPCPA factors, such as general
economic conditions, that could be influencing changes in the pro se
rate. Another possibility is that bankruptcy lawyers are providing
a screening function by declining to represent debtors with poor
cases. This would leave the pro se pool with a disproportionate
share of cases that were likely to be dismissed without a discharge.
This seems unlikely in Chapter 7, where the main eligibility screen
is the means test,211 which low-income debtors pass more easily. The
significantly lower incomes of pro se filers actually make them a
better pool of bankruptcy candidates.
There could also be other unobserved factors that are increasing
the chances of a pro se debtor having her case dismissed. For
example, some pro se debtors may be sorting themselves into the
wrong chapter by filing Chapter 7 with too much income or Chapter
13 with too little. Again, this is unlikely in Chapter 7, because pro
se filers, as a group, do not have “too much” income. The lower
incomes of pro se debtors make them even less likely to fail the
means test than represented debtors. 
A closer examination of the motions brought against consumer
debtors, however, provides support for the idea that the bankruptcy
system itself is playing a role. Pro se debtors do not appear to be
losing disproportionately on substantive grounds. Rather, the
motions to dismiss brought against them suggest that the issue is
technical problems with their petitions.
BAPCPA added so many procedural hurdles to the Bankruptcy
Code that the 2007 CBP added a new variable: the technical
deficiency motion.212 In 2001, the CBP recorded motions to dismiss
and challenges to the discharge brought against debtors, but did not
211. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West Supp. 2010).
212. CBP (2007).
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sort these motions into subcategories.213 In 2007, when a creditor or
trustee brought such motions, the CBP coded it as substantive or
technical.214 The technical problems cited ranged from failing to
update tax records, to filling out forms incorrectly, to missing the
deadline for stating whether the debtor intended to surrender her
house or car.215 The technical deficiency motion category also in-
cluded orders to show why a case should not be dismissed that are
issued automatically by the clerk’s office when a petition is incom-
plete.216
These technical difficulties appear to account for all the problems
pro se debtors were experiencing.217 If one excludes the cases in
which the debtor was alleged to have had technical issues, pro se
filers actually fared slightly better in Chapter 7 than their repre-
sented counterparts, with every single pro se receiving a discharge. 
Technical deficiencies are more likely to affect unrepresented
debtors negatively in two ways. First, pro se debtors may file their
bankruptcy petitions incorrectly in the first instance. Second,
among bankruptcy petitions that do contain errors, lawyers may be
able to better correct such problems and avoid dismissal. The data
provide support for both possibilities.218 Pro se debtors were sig-
nificantly more likely than their represented counterparts to face
such motions. In addition, they were significantly less likely to
correct these deficiencies and avoid dismissal.
Chapter 7 technical deficiency motions were filed in 43.1 percent
of pro se cases, but in only 16.7 percent of cases in which the debtor
had legal representation.219 This difference was statistically sig-
nificant. As was the case with outcomes, debtors who used petition
preparers had results that fell in between, with a rate of 34.2
percent.
213. CBP (2001).
214. CBP (2007).
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
216. CBP (2007).
217. See infra tbl.4.
218. See infra tbl.4.
219. The rate of technical deficiencies in cases in which the debtor was represented may
have declined since the time of the study. Many lawyers were probably still learning the new
law in 2007, which may have contributed to the relatively high percentage of incorrect
petitions among represented debtors.
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Table 4. Deficiency Motions in Chapter 7, by Representation,
2007
Type of 
Representation
Number of Cases
with Technical
Deficiency 
Motions
Total
Number of
Cases
Percentage
with Technical
Deficiency 
Motions
Pro Se Debtors 25 58 43.1
Debtors Using
Petition 
Preparers
13 38 34.2
Represented
Debtors 253 1515 16.7
Total 291 1611 18.1
Difference between pro se and lawyer cases was statistically signifi-
cant at p=.000 using Yates chi-square. Difference between preparer
and pro se cases was not statistically significant. Difference between
preparer and lawyer cases was statistically significant at p<.01 using
Yates chi-square.
Lawyers also appear to have a major impact on whether such
deficiencies are corrected.220 Cases in which a lawyer was retained
were much less likely to be dismissed in response to a technical
deficiency motion than pro se cases. In fact, 40 percent of pro se
cases that faced technical deficiency motions were ultimately dis-
missed, whereas the rate for represented debtors was only approxi-
mately 7 percent.221 This difference was statistically significant. 
220. See infra tbl.5.
221. It was not possible to tell whether the case was dismissed as a result of the technical
deficiency motion or for some other reason, but the fact that both occur in a disproportionate
number of pro se cases is suggestive.
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Table 5. Chapter 7: Chances of Dismissal or Conversion After
a Deficiency Motion, by Representation, 2007
Type of 
Representation
Number of
Cases with
Technical
Deficiency
Motions 222
Number
with 
Positive
Outcome
Number
with
Negative
Outcome
Percentage
with 
Negative
Outcome
Pro Se Debtors 25 15 10 40.0
Debtors Using
Petition 
Preparers
13 11 2 15.4
Represented
Debtors 248 231 17 7.4
Total 286 257 29 10.1
Difference between pro se and lawyer cases was statistically signifi-
cant at p<.001 using Fisher exact. Difference between preparer and
pro se cases was not statistically significant. Difference between
preparer and lawyer cases was not statistically significant.
222
These differences in outcome suggest that lawyers are able to
comply with the onerous paperwork requirements of bankruptcy,
even if they occasionally fail to do so at the outset of a case. This is
not surprising. Lawyers are more likely to understand the motions
and to know how to correct the deficiencies. They also have better
access to the other parties to discuss settling the matters and,
indeed, better access to case records and forms. Although bank-
ruptcy lawyers typically file cases and amendments electronically,
a pro se debtor may need to take off work to address a problem.
222. Figures in this column may be smaller than the corresponding ones in Table 4 due to
the exclusion from this table of cases with unknown or ambiguous outcomes.
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C. Conclusion to the Data Analysis
The data presented in this Article appear to provide support for
the argument that bankruptcy embarked on a course of bureau-
cratic disentitlement with BAPCPA. The statute’s procedural
hurdles seem to be having a negative impact on access to bank-
ruptcy both directly, through technical deficiency motions, and
indirectly, through legal costs.
The experiences of pro se debtors may shed light on both of these
points. Their lack of legal knowledge leaves them more vulnerable
to technical mistakes. And they represent one manifestation of the
bankruptcy lawyer affordability problem. Their increasing numbers
suggest that lawyers are becoming too expensive, a result with
implications for all consumer bankruptcy filers. Represented
debtors may not be forfeiting their bankruptcy discharge, but they
are probably still paying legal fees they can ill afford for assistance
in navigating what may be an unnecessarily high level of technical-
ity. 
In some ways, however, these failures may be less surprising
than the success of pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7, which had very few pro
se cases and handled them equitably. Until 2005, the bankruptcy
chapter used by the majority of consumers was fully accessible to
represented and pro se debtors alike. This achievement suggests
that an effective judicial consumer bankruptcy system, one that
meets the needs of the most vulnerable debtors, is possible and
within reach. This latter point is crucial to keep in mind as we
consider the case for administrative consumer bankruptcy.
III. RADICAL SIMPLIFICATION: THE CALL FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
The empirical analysis discussed in Part II suggests an important
question. If the cost of consumer bankruptcy after BAPCPA is so
problematic, why was the cost before BAPCPA not nearly as bad?
Pre-BAPCPA filings did not require lawyers in the sense that pro se
filers could manage on their own, but the overwhelming majority of
debtors still used attorneys. And the median legal fee in Chapter 7
may have been closer to $700 than $1100, but $700 is still a large
sum to a family on the verge of financial collapse. Why not go to the
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root of the problem and eliminate the need for this expense
altogether? Many have proposed just that.
A. A Brief History of Consumer Bankruptcy’s Almost-ran
The most prominent alternate vision of American consumer
bankruptcy has been administrative bankruptcy: the restructuring
of the system as an administrative program rather than a judicial
institution.223 The process would become informal, removing the
need for consumers to pay for representation.224 In his history of
American bankruptcy law, Professor David Skeel calls the lack of a
consumer bankruptcy administrator the “dog that didn’t bark,”
referring to a Sherlock Holmes story in which a clue is significant
due to its absence.225 Professor Frank Kennedy has similarly noted
that virtually every nonparticipant who has studied the American
system has proposed administrative bankruptcy as the obvious
solution to its various ills.226
The absence of administrative consumer bankruptcy has not been
for lack of trying. Until the debates that culminated with the
passage of BAPCPA in 2005, every major bankruptcy reform effort
of the past century has been met with a challenge from administra-
tive bankruptcy proponents. From the inception of a permanent
bankruptcy system in 1898 to the reforms of the Great Depression,
and again during the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code in
223. Other systems are also considering a similar step. For example, there has been a
recent push to experiment with administrative “health courts” to handle medical malpractice
claims. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative
Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 59 (2008).
224. Of course, the consumer bankruptcy system could be restructured around
administrative decision makers without reducing the number of lawyers, or it could decrease
the need for lawyers while maintaining its judicial nature. However, the roles of lawyers and
judges are linked; one of the major goals of a nonjudicial system is to reduce the need for
lawyers. In addition, I argue that both the court system and the presence of a substantial
number of lawyers have been important in protecting consumer bankruptcy from bureaucratic
disentitlement.
225. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 89-90.
226. Frank R. Kennedy, Foreword, A Brief History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.
L. REV. 667, 670 (1980) (“When any student not involved as a functionary within the system
has examined bankruptcy administration as it has evolved in this country, the resulting
report has frequently recommended a diminution of the judicial character of bankruptcy and
reduced involvement of judicial personnel in the process.”). 
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the 1970s,227 administrative consumer bankruptcy was the domi-
nant alternative for reforming the system, although it was rejected
on each occasion.228 More recently, there has been renewed interest
in the idea since BAPCPA’s exacerbation of some of the current
system’s flaws.229 It is easy to see why. Judicial apparatus is
expensive, and the overwhelming majority of consumer bankruptcy
cases are nonadversarial in nature.230 This Part will briefly discuss
the shape these proposals have taken and the arguments that
support them.
After a century of false starts, in 1898 Congress enacted what
would become a permanent consumer bankruptcy system,231 and it
was judicial in nature. The late nineteenth-century debates over ad-
ministrative bankruptcy were of an entirely different character than
those of later generations. The relevant issues in the 1890s were
concerns about federal overreaching and costs.232 In short, pro-
creditor interests, which wanted a federal bankruptcy law, had to
reassure pro-debtor interests that the new system would be neither
too intrusive nor expensive.233 This reassurance took the form of
cutting from the legislation all the administrative oversight that
had been proposed in earlier bills.234 What emerged was a court-
based system managed by referees, the predecessors of federal
bankruptcy judges.235 Though much would change over the next
century, the judicial system would remain.
The Depression-era proposal for administrative consumer bank-
ruptcy grew out of a New York judicial investigation that resulted
in the legal and criminal sanctioning of nearly two dozen bank-
ruptcy attorneys.236 In the wake of this scandal, President Hoover
227. See Ann Morales Olazábal & Andrew J. Foti, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform and 11
U.S.C. § 707(b): A Case-Based Analysis, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 317, 322-23 (2003).
228. See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).
229. Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Nation-Level Bankruptcy Filing Rates, in CONSUMER
CREDIT, DEBT AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 225, 225
(Johanna Niemi, Iain Ramsay & William C. Whitford eds., 2009).
230. See infra Part III.B; see also Mann & Porter, supra note 22, at 336.
231. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 24-25.
232. Id. at 40.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 40-41.
235. Id. at 41.
236. Id. at 77.
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appointed his Solicitor General, Thomas Thacher—who, as a district
judge, had authorized the New York investigation—to examine
bankruptcy practice nationally.237 The nationwide report found that
bankruptcy practice was riddled with conflicts of interest and
controlled by professionals who benefitted from them.238 The
proposed solution was administrative bankruptcy.239 The Thacher
report called for the creation of a civil service division under the
Attorney General.240 Judicial officers would continue to be the
ultimate decision makers, but the new administrative officials
would select bankruptcy trustees, and the role of lawyers would be
significantly reduced.241 The judiciary committees of both houses of
Congress held hearings on the Thacher proposal, but it never made
it out of committee.242 New Deal legislators eventually enacted
sweeping bankruptcy reform, but the Chandler Act of 1938 did not
include any new administrative structures for the consumer
system.243
Calls for administrative consumer bankruptcy emerged again
three decades later with David T. Stanley and Marjorie Girth’s
groundbreaking empirical study.244 In 1971, the Brookings Institute
published their findings in a book that has become a classic in the
field.245 Their research helped set in motion a push for reform that
culminated with the enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code in
1978,246 though the resulting consumer system would bear little
resemblance to the one they had proposed.
At the conclusion of their study, Stanley and Girth criticized
bankruptcy as a “dreary, costly, slow, and unproductive process.”247
They attributed many of its shortcomings to the use of a “judicial
system to try to solve problems that are by nature adminis-
237. Id.
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 78-79.
240. Id. at 79.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 74.
243. Id. 
244. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 6-8.
245. Id. 
246. See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 1463, 1472 n.35 (2005).
247. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 197.
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trative.”248 Their solution was the creation of an independent federal
agency that would administer all bankruptcy cases except complex
business reorganizations.249 Civil servants would staff the agency,250 
which would emphasize the fast, informal resolution of pro-
ceedings.251 Administrative law courts would decide contested
issues.252 Most consumer debtors would not need legal representa-
tion.253
Around the same time, Congress established its own Commission
on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States (the Commission) to
study the system and to draft legislation.254 The Commission’s bill255
was, in some ways, just as administrative in nature as Stanley and
Girth’s proposal. It would have created a federal agency that would
have handled all bankruptcy cases, whether individual or corporate,
liquidation or reorganization.256 Contested matters would have pro-
ceeded to a court, rather than an administrative law forum,257 but
so few consumer cases were contested that its enactment would
have nearly eliminated judicial involvement in that part of the
bankruptcy system.258
But like its Depression-era predecessor, the Commission’s ad-
ministrative bankruptcy bill never made it to a congressional
vote.259 Interest groups, particularly those representing lawyers and
bankruptcy referees (now judges), rallied against the bill,260 creating
an atmosphere that David Stanley summarized thusly: “there is no
constituency for creating the agency.”261 The National Conference of
248. Id. at 197-98.
249. Id. at 199-213.
250. Id. at 203-04.
251. Id. at 215.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 204.
254. Jeb Barnes, Bankrupt Bargain? Bankruptcy Reform and the Politics of Adversarial
Legalism, 13 J.L. & POL. 893, 909 (1997); Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New
Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 942-43 (1979).
255. EXECUTIVE DIR., COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137 (1973).
256. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 139.
257. Kennedy, supra note 226, at 672-73.
258. Barnes, supra note 254, at 911-12.
259. Id. at 919.
260. A detailed interest-group analysis of these events is presented in Part IV.C.3.
261. Barnes, supra note 254, at 913 (quoting Revising the Bankruptcy Law, BUS. WK., Feb.
24, 1975, at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Bankruptcy Referees262 introduced an alternate bill that preserved
the judicial components of the system.263 The Bankruptcy Code of
1978 that eventually grew out of this process was a compromise
between the two bills and their supporters, but there was no
compromise on the administrative-judicial issue. The new Code
strengthened the judicial nature of the process, enhancing the
status of bankruptcy judges and lawyers264 and ensconcing bank-
ruptcy firmly within the federal court system.265
Although Congress has not considered administrative consumer
bankruptcy legislation since the 1970s, calls for its enactment have
continued. For example, in the 1990s, bankruptcy expert Kenneth
Klee—in his role as the legislative chair of the influential National
Bankruptcy Conference266—testified before the House Judiciary
Committee that an administrative agency could manage consumer
bankruptcy more effectively than the current system.267 
More recently, as BAPCPA has engendered renewed interest in
bankruptcy costs, administrative bankruptcy has become more
appealing again. Professor Ronald Mann has most effectively made
the recent argument.268 Mann’s proposal addresses the situation in
which the argument for an administrative system is the strongest:
low-income, low-asset (LILA) cases in which the debtor will never
have the means to repay any meaningful amount of the debt
owed.269 He argues that, for these debtors, “processing at the lowest
possible transaction cost should be the goal” and that the most
effective way to reduce these transaction costs would be through an
262. This group is now the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. Kennedy, supra
note 226, at 673.
263. Id.
264. See generally Robert L. Eisen & David K. Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978—An Elevated Judiciary, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 1007 (1979).
265. See generally Barnes, supra note 254 (arguing that bankruptcy’s position within the
federal court system acts as an obstacle to legal reform).
266. Braucher, supra note 10, at 450 n.182.
267. See Should Consumer Bankruptcy Be an Administrative Procedure?, 4 CONSUMER
BANKR. NEWS, Nov. 10, 1994. 
268. See Mann, supra note 229, at 225; see also Charles M. Foster & Stephen L. Poe,
Consumer Bankruptcy: A Proposal To Reform Chapters 7 and 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
104 DICK. L. REV. 579, 615-16 (2000) (arguing that a streamlined administrative consumer
system would more efficiently accomplish the goals of both creditors and other interest groups
than the BAPCPA predecessor bill that was then before Congress).
269. Mann, supra note 229, at 243.
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administrative system.270 Under his system, the state’s main role in
LILA cases would be the prevention and detection of fraud.271
Presumably, the debtor would submit a petition to an administra-
tive agency, which would grant a discharge unless there was sus-
picion of fraud. Mann suggests that cases could be resolved in a
matter of days or weeks, rather than months.272 Mann elaborates on
this proposal in an article he co-authored with Professor Katherine
Porter, arguing that “the system should operate differently for
people in irretrievable distress. With these debtors having so little
income and few assets, the model should be a streamlined adminis-
trative proceeding with low fees for access.”273
B. Why Administrative Bankruptcy?
The arguments for converting consumer bankruptcy from a
judicial to an administrative process are clear: judicial apparatus is
expensive and appears to be unnecessary in the overwhelming
majority of cases. This Section fleshes out these arguments, pre-
senting the strongest case for administrative bankruptcy, in order
to contrast it with the case for retaining a judicial system, which is
discussed in Part IV.
The data analyzed in Part II suggest that the current system is,
indeed, prohibitively expensive for debtors. Technical hurdles mean
that debtors have difficulty succeeding in bankruptcy without
lawyers, leaving those worst off to choose between delaying bank-
ruptcy for months and forgoing its relief altogether. 
And this judicial machinery cannot be justified by a high number
of controversies to resolve. There is no doubt that in Chapter 7, the
percentage of consumer cases with contested matters has always
been miniscule. As Professor Elizabeth Warren has stated, “Bank-
ruptcy is essentially the nonlitigation approach to the resolution of
unmet legal obligations.”274 No matter which way one parses the
270. Id. at 243-44.
271. Id. at 244; Mann & Porter, supra note 22, at 338.
272. Mann, supra note 229, at 244.
273. Mann & Porter, supra note 22, at 338. For an additional description of Mann’s
proposal, see Ronald Mann, A New Chapter for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at
A27. 
274. Elizabeth Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 915, 918 (2005).
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data, it is clear that, until recently, Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy
has not been an adversarial process and that this has been the case
for at least nearly fifty years.
As far back as 1964,275 Stanley and Girth found that most
creditors did not participate in consumer liquidations276 and that
they objected to the discharge even less frequently, at a rate of 1
percent.277 Data from the 2001 CBP suggest a similar trend. In that
year, only 1.9 percent of Chapter 7 debtors faced a motion to dismiss
or objection to the discharge.278 
There was little change in substantive objections after BAPCPA.
If one excludes technical deficiency motions, the percentage of cases
with objections to discharge or motions to dismiss rose to 4 percent
in 2007, a statistically significant change, but a small number
nonetheless.279 When technical deficiency motions are included, the
percentage of debtors facing one of these motions rises to 21 percent.
This percentage, however, is not directly comparable to the 1.9
percent from 2001 because the CBP used different coding methodol-
ogies for this variable in the two years.280 For the most part, on a
substantive level, Chapter 7 remains a nonadversarial process.
This does not mean, however, that we should abandon judicial
consumer bankruptcy in Chapter 7. The reasons why retaining our
system of lawyers and judges is nonetheless important are the
subject of Part IV.
275. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 7 (stating that their sample consists of cases that
closed in 1964).
276. Id. at 77.
277. Id. at 91. Trustees objected slightly more often, at a rate of 3 percent. Id.
278. Motions to dismiss or objections to discharge were brought in 15 of the 778 Chapter
7 cases.
279. It is significant at p<.05 using the Pearson chi-square test.
280. In 2007, the technical deficiency motions category included automatic orders to show
cause issued by the clerk’s office, as well as motions brought by a trustee or creditor. The 2001
CBP, on the other hand, did not include these orders to show cause in its motion variables.
Because of this, we cannot compare the total percentage of motions brought in each year.
However, the 2007 CBP only included the orders to show cause in the technical deficiency
motions variable, not in any of its substantive motions categories, so the rates of substantive
motions brought in each year are comparable. The increase from 1.9 to 4 percent is a valid
contrast.
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IV. THE CASE FOR CAUTION
Administrative bankruptcy proponents frequently look to the
bankruptcy systems of Europe and other countries for models of how
a U.S. administrative system could function.281 But it seems just as
likely that, in practice, such a system would come to resemble other
U.S. administrative programs, such as welfare or disability benefits.
These programs have a difficult history and a reputation for
producing hostile bureaucracies that render them highly inaccessi-
ble. In contrast, despite all the new procedural barriers, bankruptcy
does a much better job of providing the legal benefit for which it was
designed.282 
And yet, as discussed in Part I, administrative safety net pro-
grams have a surprising amount in common with bankruptcy. Both
types of systems serve a financially distressed, stigmatized popula-
tion. Both programs must guard against the perception that their
beneficiaries are getting something for nothing. Both employ the
strategy of “bureaucratic disentitlement,” using procedural barriers
as a way of reducing substantive rights.283 But bankruptcy has
adopted this approach just recently with BAPCPA, and that statute
has been only partially successful in its attempt to discourage its
beneficiaries.
One reason for this difference may be that consumer bankruptcy
is a judicial system. Factors such as a paid bar, a strong bench, and
the prestige-enhancing association with corporate bankruptcy may
play a protective role in separating consumer bankruptcy from “poor
people’s programs,” which all too often become poor programs.
281. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 229, at 242-44.
282. This Article focuses on only the policy arguments against administrative consumer
bankruptcy, but such a system might raise constitutional concerns as well. See N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (holding that the Bankruptcy
Code enacted in 1978 included an unconstitutional grant of judicial authority to non-Article
III decision makers, because, inter alia, bankruptcy fell outside the scope of the public rights
doctrine that permits Congress to delegate the power to “determin[e] matters arising between
the Government and others” to the legislative and executive branches (citing Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929))).
283. See supra Part I.C.
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A. Our Dysfunctional Administrative State
When Stanley and Girth published their landmark study in 1971,
the public had more faith in government’s ability to improve the
lives of ordinary citizens. Their administrative proposal depended
on a strong confidence in the modern efficiency of administrative
agencies and the civil service meritocracy.284 They argued that an
executive agency would be more efficient than judicial consumer
bankruptcy because federal agencies have better incentives to
develop effective programs and management.285 That optimistic
vision of the administrative state has since been widely discredited.
The conception that replaced it is one of complex bureaucracy
staffed by indifferent officials. Professor Jerry Mashaw, a disability
benefits expert, perhaps best summarized this newer vision of the
administrative state. When discussing the frequent use of the term
“Kafkaesque” to describe the Social Security Administration (SSA),
he noted wryly that “Kafka gained many of his impressions of
administrative processes as a bureaucrat in an agency dispensing
disability benefits.”286
Generally, the type of informal, nonadversarial287 system Stanley
and Girth envisioned for consumer bankruptcy has not been
successful in other contexts. In programs such as welfare, social
security disability, and veterans’ benefits, claimants have fewer
process protections than they do in bankruptcy, but just as much
need for them. And this loss in process does not appear to be
compensated with a corresponding gain in efficiency. These admin-
istrative programs share several negative characteristics, some of
which bankruptcy has avoided altogether, and others which it
manifests, but to a lesser degree. A brief comparison with these
three analogous U.S. administrative programs reveals that, even
with the new law, bankruptcy has more manageable procedural
284. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 198-200.
285. Id. at 200, 218.
286. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 91 n.9 (1983). 
287. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 215. The Social Security Administration (SSA)
and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) also characterize their processes as informal and
nonadversarial. See Steven K. Berenson, Legal Services for Struggling Veterans—Then and
Now, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 101, 120 (2009) (discussing the VA); Jon C. Dubin,
Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine to Inquisitorial
Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1299 (1997) (discussing the SSA).
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hurdles, more widespread legal representation, and higher quality
decision making.
Welfare, social security disability, and veterans’ benefits are
obviously not the only administrative systems that serve the
financially distressed. Programs such as unemployment, workers’
injury compensation, and even retirement-based social security
serve comparable goals. I chose these three, not for their representa-
tiveness, but because they are plausible worst-case scenarios for
consumer bankruptcy. My argument is not that administrative
bankruptcy would inevitably replicate their exact pathologies, but
rather that bankruptcy could face broadly similar problems if it
were reformed without close attention to these negative possibili-
ties. In addition, examining these programs’ weaknesses provides
a useful contrast that illuminates consumer bankruptcy’s strengths.
Welfare is probably the closest analog to bankruptcy, in that the
most important eligibility requirement for both is a lack of in-
come.288 I added social security disability and veterans’ benefits to
address the potential objection that, despite the recent negative
rhetoric about consumer bankruptcy filers, they are still not as
deeply stigmatized as welfare recipients. The examples of social
security disability and veterans’ benefits demonstrate that dysfunc-
tionality may occur even when the beneficiary population is
regarded neutrally or with admiration.
1. Procedural Barriers
The most pervasive of the negative features of benefits systems
are procedural barriers that prevent applicants from receiving
benefits. In the welfare context, officials engage in what one com-
mentator characterizes as “verification extremism.”289 The failure to
meet steep paperwork, documentation, and other administrative
requirements plays a major role in the denial and termination of
288. This is true only of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, not of Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter 7
is the more appropriate comparison because it serves most of the low-income, low-asset filers
who are the primary target for administrative-bankruptcy reform. See, e.g., Mann & Porter,
supra note 22, at 290 n.5 (citing the 2007 CBP sample, in which 95.1 percent of Chapter 7
cases were denominated as “no asset” cases); see also Mann, supra note 229, at 243.
289. David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231,
242 (1998).
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benefits.290 In California, for example, beneficiaries complete
detailed initial paperwork, annual renewal paperwork, and quar-
terly or monthly reports of any financial changes, which may
include minor changes in household expenses.291 Not surprisingly,
a census of California cases in December 2008 found that 45 percent
of terminated cases were ended due to paperwork problems.292 This
type of procedural hurdle is not limited to California or to strict
measures enacted with welfare reform during the 1990s. For most
of the 1980s, federal regulations required all food stamp recipients
to attend budgeting meetings at their welfare office every month. At
these meetings, they could lose their benefits for failing to provide
documentation of any changes in their household budgets.293
Another major reason for denying and terminating benefits is
missed appointments with caseworkers. Although at first glance,
keeping an appointment with one’s welfare officer does not sound
technically difficult, these appointments come with a surprising
number of administrative challenges. Often, the appointments are
scheduled without consulting the welfare recipient,294 who, by legal
requirement, is juggling work responsibilities and child care ar-
rangements.295 In some cases, the recipient never receives any
notice of the meeting.296 In the 1990s, New York City developed an
antifraud program that required a meeting at one location that
served welfare applicants from the entire city, no matter how far
away they lived.297 
Although welfare represents the most extreme point on this
spectrum, even more politically popular programs present proce-
dural barriers. Applicants for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
disability benefits must complete a complex, twenty-three page
application298 and satisfy high documentation requirements.299
290. Gustafson, supra note 75, at 674.
291. Id. at 645-46.
292. Id. at 674 n.144.
293. Kennedy, supra note 289, at 242-43.
294. Super, supra note 114, at 1111.
295. Jeffrey, supra note 120, at 146-47.
296. Id. at 153.
297. Id. at 146.
298. Berenson, supra note 287, at 118.
299. As one veterans’ attorney advised in an article for lawyers considering entering the
field: 
Be prepared to lose some claims because you can never locate enough
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Researchers have found the system to be confusing to veterans,
lacking in clear rules, and steeped in bureaucratic redundancies.300
Numerous studies have been devoted to determining how best to
improve the claims process, but progress is not apparent. As
recently as 2007, a 562-page report by the Veterans’ Disability
Benefits Commission characterized the claims process as “extremely
complex and often not understood by veterans, some of the veterans
service representatives, and by many VA employees.”301
Perhaps the biggest process factor that prevents veterans from
obtaining benefits is time. The VA is notoriously slow. According to
the Agency’s own 2008 materials, it took an average of 1215 days,
or nearly three years, for a case to make its way through one
intermediate, appellate step.302 As of 2009, the entire process took
a typical veteran six to seven years,303 an extremely long time for
someone seeking benefits because a disability left her unable to
support herself fully.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the disability program for
people with limited work histories, faces a similar problem.
Although the act of filing a claim may be relatively easy—in several
states,304 more than half of the claims are filed by telephone305—
ensuring its quality is more difficult. Budget cuts have forced the
SSA to reduce the amount of assistance available to applicants, and
documentation. You may have to look your client in the eye and tell your client
that you absolutely believe that the events the client told you about occurred.
But you will never be able to substantiate the claim to VA’s satisfaction and that
VA will never award your client any benefits. 
David Ackerly, Special Considerations When Representing Military Veteran Clients, 43
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 249, 253 (2009).
300. VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY: VETERANS’
DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 325 (2007), available at http://veterans.senate.gov/
upload/VetDisBenefitComm9-27.pdf. 
301. Id. at 329.
302. 2008 BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS ANN. REPORT 19 [hereinafter BVA CHAIRMAN
REPORT], available at http://www.va.gov/Vetapp/ChairRpt/BVA2008AR.pdf.
303. Benjamin W. Wright, The Potential Repercussions of Denying Disabled Veterans the
Freedom To Hire an Attorney, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 433, 439 (2009).
304. SSI is a federal program, but state agencies that contract with the SSA make the
initial disability determinations. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional
Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS,
DILEMMAS, AND EXPERIENCES 115, 144 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). 
305. SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., CHARTING THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY’S DISABILITY
PROGRAMS: THE NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 25 (2001) [hereinafter DISABILITY WHITE
PAPER], available at http://www.ssab.gov/publications/disability/disabilitywhitepap.pdf. 
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many claimants do not understand the criteria used to decide their
claims.306 A high-quality initial application is particularly important
because SSI applicants face three levels of internal administrative
appeals and an average wait of more than two-and-a-half years307
before they are eligible to pursue their claims in court.308 This
process has been described as “complex, multilayered, torpid, and
increasingly adversarial.”309
In contrast, as discussed in Part II, pre-2005 Chapter 7
bankruptcy appears to have been more useable than any of these
three programs. Bankruptcy did, however, add significant new
procedural hurdles with BAPCPA, which have had a negative
impact on the system’s functioning.310 This is a serious issue and
needs to be addressed. But the example of the U.S. administrative
programs does not recommend them as a satisfactory alternative in
this regard. All three of the programs provide equal, if not greater,
opportunity for procedural disentitlement.
Two additional positive procedural features of consumer bank-
ruptcy highlight the ways in which the system is relatively success-
ful. The first is decision-making time. In contrast to the years that
disability and veteran claimants must wait for a determination, a
typical Chapter 7 case takes only a few months from filing to dis-
charge.311 This short timeframe is particularly noteworthy because
speed should be one of the selling points for an administrative
system. Administrative bankruptcy proponents have argued that,
without the delays engendered by cumbersome judicial machinery,
306. Id. at 6.
307. Id. at 7 chart 7.
308. Mashaw, supra note 304, at 140; see Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 470-74
(1986).
309. Jerry L. Mashaw, Disability: Why Does the Search for Good Programs Continue?, in
SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 105, 117 (Eric R. Kingson & James H. Schulz eds.,
1997). 
310. See supra Part II.B.
311. Data from 2007 CBP. The difference in case processing times could also relate to
attorney incentives. Disability and veterans’ benefits attorneys are frequently paid based on
a percentage of the back benefits that are eventually awarded, giving them incentives to slow
down the process. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 20-21; VETERANS’ CLAIMS
ADJUDICATION COMM’N, VETERANS’ CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMMISSION REPORT 117-18 (1996),
available at https://www.1888932-2946.ws/vetscommission/e-documentmanager/gallery/
Documents/Reference_Materials/VCACReport_1pdf. Bankruptcy lawyers, on the other hand,
are paid with a flat fee, which incentivizes them to handle cases quickly. GAO DOLLAR COSTS
REPORT, supra note 147, at 21.
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case processing times could theoretically be reduced to weeks or
days.312 But the experience of other U.S. administrative programs
suggests that, in practice, this would be unlikely to occur.313
The second positive feature is the way consumer bankruptcy
respects its beneficiaries’ time. As early as the 1960s, some courts
were not requiring debtors to attend Chapter 13 examinations in
order to save them an “unnecessary loss of working time.”314
Similarly, most modern bankruptcy courts have abandoned any
discharge hearing and are sending the relevant documents by mail
“on the theory that requiring a struggling debtor to lose a day’s pay
to attend a discharge ceremony is wasteful.”315 This process stands
in stark contrast to the welfare approach, in which missing one of
the many required face-to-face meetings is a significant factor in the
denial and termination of benefits.316 Since at least 1996, welfare
programs have been explicitly work based, and many recipients are
single mothers with childcare concerns, but the system consistently
manifests disrespect for its beneficiaries’ working time.317
2. Unmet Legal Needs
A second negative characteristic shared by administrative bene-
ficiary programs is a significant unmet need for lawyers. In the
welfare context, the situation is particularly dire. It is extremely
difficult for claimants to obtain legal representation on welfare
matters. Their main source of counsel is legal aid organizations, but
even before the budget cuts and federally imposed restrictions of the
1990s,318 welfare cases represented a small percentage of these
offices’ caseloads.319 By 2001, only 2.6 percent of legal aid cases were
312. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 229, at 244.
313. See supra notes 287-309 and accompanying text; supra Part III.B.
314. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 95.
315. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 54, at 229.
316. See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
317. See Super, supra note 114, at 1111.
318. In the mid-1990s, Congress substantially reduced the Legal Services Corporation’s
budget and imposed restrictions on the type of cases that its grantees could bring. See id. at
1094. Many of the restrictions were procedural, such as a ban on class actions, but Congress
imposed substantive restrictions on welfare litigation, some of which were later disallowed
by the Supreme Court. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547 (2001).
319. In 1983, for example, 5.4 percent of Legal Services cases dealt with welfare matters
and 2.6 percent were related to food stamps. Super, supra note 114, at 1094-95. 
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welfare related, with an additional 1.1 percent dealing with food
stamps.320 Lawyers may be crucial in these cases. As discussed
above, welfare beneficiaries have a high risk of procedural disen-
franchisement.321 Studies have found that a claimant with repre-
sentation has a good chance of reversing a negative outcome, but
that these individual decisions rarely change agency practices.322
Unrepresented claimants suffering from the same problem are left
with no remedy.
This lack of representation is especially problematic because of
the recent trend of involving the criminal justice system in welfare
cases. The scope of criminally prosecutable welfare fraud has been
broadened to include matters such as failing to report an increase
in income.323 Any statements made to this effect—or any form
document signed to this effect—in an administrative hearing may
be used against a welfare recipient in a later criminal prosecution
for welfare fraud and, due to collateral estoppel, will not be subject
to challenge.324 The bankruptcy system is similarly sensitive to
fraud, but practices like this are unheard of there.
The need for lawyers in the VA disability system is noteworthy
for contrasting reasons. Unlike the welfare system, the veterans’
benefits process was specifically designed to be user friendly. The
VA is charged with a “duty to assist” veterans in developing their
cases,325 even though the agency is also deciding the claims. The
evidentiary standard is “as likely as not,” which is lower than the
preponderance of evidence standard used in typical civil cases.326 In
addition, veterans’ services organizations (VSOs) such as the
Foreign Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars have long-standing
programs that provide free lay advocates for VA applicants.327 If any
group of claimants would be able to succeed without counsel,
veterans should be that group.
320. Id.
321. See supra notes 95-97, 102-04, 114-20 and accompanying text.
322. See Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861, 868 (1990).
323. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10980(a) (West 2010).
324. Gustafson, supra note 75, at 710 n.308. 
325. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1) (2006).
326. See id. § 5107(b).
327. Berenson, supra note 287, at 121.
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Even with these advantages, however, VA claimants have sig-
nificant unmet legal needs. Veterans suffer a high error rate at the
initial level, where very few of them are represented due to a ban on
paid representation.328 For example, a U.S. district court recently
found that as many as 44 percent of claims certified for appeal may
contain avoidable mistakes.329 When veterans appeal their cases,
representation makes a major difference in the outcome. In 2009, 49
percent of pro se veterans had their appeals denied at the interme-
diate appellate level, which was true of only 30 percent of claimants
with lawyers and 31 to 43 percent with lay representation through
VSOs.330
Efforts have been made to increase the availability of lawyers for
appeals, but they have fallen short. In 1991, Congress reallocated
a portion of the budget of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (CAVC) to funding programs that would provide legal
representation for veterans—at the request of the court itself.331 In
2006, Congress recognized that there was still a major problem and
repealed the Civil War-era cap of $10 on the fees lawyers may
charge for appeals within the administrative system,332 although
fees are still prohibited at the initial stage.333 It even went so far as
to allow contingency fees, although at a lower level than those
typically charged in private cases.334 Nevertheless, 70 percent of
328. Lawyers are prohibited from charging for representation unless the claim has
proceeded beyond the initial determination, thus limiting the number of veterans who have
counsel at this stage. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
329. Berenson, supra note 287, at 122 (citing Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F.
Supp. 2d 1049, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).
330. BVA CHAIRMAN REPORT, supra note 302, at 23. The VSO Paralyzed Veterans of
America had a denial rate of only 23.8 percent, although the organization’s name suggests
that its clients may be disproportionately disabled. Id. Lay representatives from VSOs
tended to have the highest rates of allowed claims, whereas lawyers had the highest number
of remands. Id. This data is from fiscal year 2008. Id.
331. See NAT’L VETERANS LEGAL SERVS. PROGRAM, NVLSP LEGAL PRO BONO OPPORTUNITIES
(2010) [hereinafter NVLSP PRO BONO], http://www.nvlsp.org/ProBonoWork/. 
332. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1). 
333. See id.
334. Attorneys may charge a maximum of 33.3 percent of any award. Berenson, supra note
287, at 133-34. They are further incentivized to charge no more than 20 percent because the
VA will pay the fees directly to the lawyer if the contingency is at or below that rate. Id. As
with SSI beneficiaries, many claimants will have accrued a backlog of benefits by the time all
appeals are resolved, so attorneys using contingency fees may receive meaningful
compensation. Id. at 133. However, many contend that these caps are too low given the time,
risk, and outlay required to bring these appeals. Id. at 134. 
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veterans do not have attorneys at the time that they exit the
administrative appeals system and seek relief at the CAVC.335 And
despite a wealth of programs intended to bridge that gap, 19 percent
of veterans still lack attorneys by the time their appeals conclude.336
Like the VA, the SSA has a duty to develop both sides of the case
in making disability determinations.337 And even at the third level
of administrative appeal, regulations require that the process be
conducted in an “informal, nonadversary manner.”338 Despite these
features, claimants report difficulty in navigating the process
without representation.339 Indeed, the system is structured so that
claimants must undergo two rounds of decision making in which
they are more likely than not to be denied before they reach the
level of appeal in which they are more likely to prevail.340 This
appellate process has resulted in an impression among the benefi-
ciary population that the early denials are designed to reduce the
number of meritorious claims by weeding out claimants who do not
have the wherewithal to last through multiple levels of appeals.341
335. See NVLSP PRO BONO, supra note 331. 
336. Berenson, supra note 287, at 114-15.
337. Dubin, supra note 287, at 1302.
338. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(b) (2010).
339. See, e.g., MSWorld.org, Questions About USA Social Security Benefits, http://www.
msworld.org/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=19 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
340. In FY 2000, SSA granted 38 percent of claims at the initial level, 16 percent of claims
at the first level of reconsideration, and 62 percent of claims at the second level of
administrative appeal. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 8 chart 8. There are a
number of possible explanations for the increased generosity at this second level of appeal.
First, this level of appeal is primarily hearing-based, whereas the first reconsideration is
primarily record-based. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.1453(a) (second level), with id. § 416.1420
(first level). Second, the decision makers at this second level are Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs), who operate independently of certain SSA restrictions, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 513-14 (1978) (discussing federal ALJ independence from agencies), and are, as I argue
below, better qualified than the initial reviewers. Third, more claimants obtain counsel or lay
representation for this stage of proceedings. See DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at
9, 18. Fourth, it is also possible that those with weaker cases are not pursuing multiple levels
of reconsideration. Of the approximately 1,232,824 claims that were denied at the initial
determination in FY 2000, only 433,584 (approximately 35 percent) were appealed this far.
Id. at 8 chart 8. I have doubts about how much this last factor contributes, however. It seems
equally as likely that the most disabled among the initially-denied claimants would have the
lowest ability to appeal. This would cause the population of claimants who reached the ALJ
level to be skewed in the other direction. The figures in this footnote include determinations
for the Disability Insurance (DI) program, for individuals with substantial pre-disability work
history, and for SSI. Id.
341. Indeed, this was the understanding of the system that I gained from years of working
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By the second level of appeal, nearly 60 percent of claimants have
obtained counsel and another 13 to 14 percent have lay representa-
tion.342
The consumer bankruptcy pro se rate looks quite low by compari-
son. The percentage of debtors representing themselves in Chapter
7 has risen to approximately 3.6 percent in the wake of BAPCPA,343
and as the negative outcomes these debtors experience demonstrate,
this is too many. But it is still much lower than the 40 percent of
disability applicants or the 70 percent of VA claimants who pass the
initial determination and reach two levels of appeal without coun-
sel.344 This is partly by design. These programs are supposed to
operate in an informal, nonadversarial manner.345 But, as the dis-
cussion below suggests, this model has not been a success.
3. Low-Quality Decision Makers Making Low-Quality Decisions
In addition to procedural barriers and unmet legal needs, these
administrative programs share a tendency to use lower-quality deci-
sion makers who generate a problematic number of poor decisions.
Over the past several decades, each program has undergone a sys-
tematic deprofessionalization of its frontline decision makers, the
officials who make the first determination about a claimant’s case.
In all three systems, these shifts correlated with an increasingly
rule-bound process that decreased decision-maker discretion. The
results are generally considered ineffective.
For welfare programs, the evolution has been from social workers
to “eligibility technicians.”346 In welfare’s early decades, caseworkers
operated under a “social work model” that emphasized a paternalis-
tic interest in helping low-income families.347 Although the system
in an unrelated capacity with many individuals who received SSI. It was not corrected until
I researched the matter myself.
342. These figures are from the mid-1990s. Dubin, supra note 287, at 1294 n.29.
343. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 335, 342 and accompanying text. I have not been able to obtain exact
numbers for welfare claimants, but the LSC data discussed by Super, supra note 114, at 1093-
95, suggest that the number of welfare claimants with representation is very low.
345. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
346. Simon, supra note 114, at 1215.
347. Id. at 1214 n.45; see also David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the
Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 819 (2004).
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never achieved its goal of staffing entire offices with social workers,
social work ideals infused welfare programs. These ideals exerted
an upward pressure on caseworker education and training, which
frontline workers needed to make the particularized, moralistic
judgments with which they were charged.348 When the bureaucratic
model of welfare emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, caseworker qual-
ifications plummeted. Managing welfare cases changed from a
professional job with relatively high educational requirements to a
dead-end, clerical position.349 In the words of one welfare official, the
goal was to replace people who thought like social workers with
people who thought like bank tellers.350 This trend was mirrored in
the higher levels of welfare administration, where social workers
were replaced by people with managerial backgrounds.351 
The degree of ineffectiveness that resulted—at least from a
claimant point of view352—approaches the legendary.353 Welfare
programs have achieved a dramatic drop in caseloads since the
federal reform in 1996, in part because of substantive eligibility
changes, but also in large part by discouraging applications and
denying substantively eligible claims on procedural grounds.354 For
example, between the early 1990s and 1999, the percentage of
eligible families receiving benefits decreased from 85 to 52 percent,
despite changes in eligibility requirements that reduced the number
of qualifying families.355 
A similar transition has taken place in the SSA’s disability
programs. There, the initial disability determinations that voca-
tional specialists with masters degrees used to make are now made
by low-level employees who frequently have no more than high
school diplomas.356 Because these frontline workers are technically
348. Simon, supra note 114, at 1214-15.
349. Id. at 1215-16.
350. Id. at 1216.
351. Id.
352. This ineffectiveness with respect to claimants may be accomplishing other program
goals, an issue discussed in Part I.C.
353. See Jeffrey, supra note 120, at 153.
354. See, e.g., Super, supra note 347, at 824-25.
355. Id. at 824 (citing Sheila R. Zedlewski, Left Behind or Staying Away? Eligible Parents
Who Remain off TANF 1 (Urban Inst., Assessing the New Federalism Series No. B-51, 2002),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310571_B51.pdf).
356. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 9; Mashaw, supra note 304, at 144-45.
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state employees,357 there is tremendous variation in their qualifica-
tions and salaries, with the most generous states paying 2.5 times
more than the stingiest.358 Due to budgetary pressures and state
civil service rules, the trend has been toward the lower end of this
scale.359 These constraints may also prevent the hiring of necessary
experts.360 The poor working environment correlates with high
attrition rates among frontline employees.361
These factors have resulted in poor decisional outcomes, as
measured in several ways. First, there is a high degree of state-by-
state variation.362 For example, a GAO study tested 10 state dis-
ability offices on 221 hypothetical claims and found that they
reached the same result in just 48 of them.363 Second, when denials
reach judicial and judicial-like decision makers, most of them are
reversed or remanded. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) overturn
59 percent of denials at the second internal level of appeal.364 Two
appellate levels later, federal courts reverse or remand another 54
percent of cases.365 Perhaps most tellingly, more than half of appli-
357. See Mashaw, supra note 304, at 144.
358. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 16-17.
359. Mashaw, supra note 304, at 145.
360. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 7.
361. As of 2000, 10 states had an annual attrition rate of more than 20 percent. Id. at 26.
362. Consumer bankruptcy suffers from similar state-by-state variation in chapter usage,
with some regions having much higher rates of Chapter 13 cases and others having higher
rates of Chapter 7 cases. See Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers—
Measuring Performance in Chapter 13: Comparisons Across States, http://www.justice.
gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/docs/abi082000ch13.pdf. But this problem is not an inherent
feature of judicial consumer bankruptcy and could be solved with chapter-choice reform,
which could occur in either a judicial or an administrative system.
363. Mashaw, supra note 304, at 147; see also DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305,
at 3. To be fair to the SSA, valid reasons for some geographic differences exist. Disability
claims are subject to review by “a highly decentralized judicial system.” Susan Haire &
Stefanie Lindquist, An Agency and 12 Courts: Social Security Disability Cases in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 80 JUDICATURE 230, 236 (1997). Different appellate circuits issue
profoundly different statutory interpretations, and the SSA is expected to abide by them all.
See id. at 233-36.
364. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 8 chart 8. As discussed in note 340, this
data point alone does not mean that the initial determinations are inaccurate, but it does
contribute to the larger picture painted by figures in this paragraph. 
365. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 8 chart 8. Six percent are reversed,
whereas 48 percent are remanded. Id. Of the 48 percent remanded, approximately 60 percent
are reversed by the decision maker below. Id.
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cants who are denied disability status never return to substantial
productivity.366
In the VA, the change in decision-maker qualifications was
actually the result of an effort to improve decision quality. Through
the late 1980s, the initial administrative decision was made by a
three-person panel, with one member representing each of three
specialties: legal, medical, and occupational.367 A separate three-
member panel consisting of two lawyers and one doctor then decided
the first internal appeal.368 The goal was for the professional
judgment of the decision makers to render unnecessary the
development of a detailed medical claim.369
This process came under attack as the system became subject to
judicial review.370 Until 1988, VA benefits decisions could not be
appealed to court.371 But when Congress responded to pressure to
create a system of judicial review, one of the earliest decisions
issued by the newly established Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims forbade the VA from allowing its decision makers to sub-
stitute their professional judgment for the development of a review-
able legal record.372 This prohibition resulted in a VA decision to
cease hiring physicians as adjudicators.373 Although these changes
brought the decision-making process in better accordance with the
rule of law, they also introduced substantial delays and resulted in
a body of less-qualified frontline decision makers.374 Currently, more
than one quarter do not have college degrees.375
The quality of the VA’s benefits determinations has been a matter
of concern for some time. In the academic literature, commentators
frequently use colorful language to describe the inadequacy of the
process. One describes it as “a carousel consisting of remand,
366. Mashaw, supra note 309, at 117 (citing data from 1994).
367. James D. Ridgway, Lessons the Veterans Benefits System Must Learn on Gathering
Expert Witness Evidence, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 412 (2009).
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 412-13 (citing Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991)).
373. Id. at 413.
374. See id. at 422-23.
375. See DANIEL HARRIS, CNA CORP., FINDINGS FROM RATERS AND VSOS SURVEYS 13 (2007),
available at https://www.1888932-2946.ws/vetscommission/e-documentmanager/gallery/
Documents/2007_July/CNA_Raters&NVSO-Survey_FinalReport.pdf. 
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mishandling, rehearing, remand, and so on.”376 Another states, “In
terms of making timely and accurate compensation determinations,
the VA sets low standards and consistently fails to meet them.”377 
One measure of the problem is the rate of reversals upon appeal.
In 2008, the VA’s internal Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA)
affirmed only 38.1 percent of the initial decisions made by regional
offices.378 It reversed 22.4 percent of the decisions and remanded
another 37.2 percent.379 The remand figure is particularly problem-
atic because remands are frequently the result of basic failures,
such as the lack of a medical examination or violation of notice
procedures.380 Furthermore, 75 percent of remanded cases later
return to the BVA for another round of appeals.381 The problem
continues at the next level, where over the past decade, among cases
decided on nonprocedural grounds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims has affirmed, even in part, only approximately 30
percent of BVA decisions.382 Regardless of which decision maker is
reaching the best determination, the number of appeals and
remands a veteran must undergo is troubling.
When viewed through the lens of the American administrative
safety net, the consumer bankruptcy system looks quite functional.
In contrast with the administrative programs, the frontline bank-
ruptcy decision maker is a federal judge.383 The administrative
programs’ less prestigious frontline decision makers would be a
positive, cost-saving feature if the “eligibility technicians”384 and
“raters”385 were reducing the need for judicial review, but that is
not the case. Instead of an efficient administrative system that
376. James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is
Needed To Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 229 (2001). Interestingly,
O’Reilly’s proposal is “to merge [the VA disability system] with the better-functioning federal
disability benefits appeal systems already in place for [SSA] disability claimants.” Id. at 224.
377. Wright, supra note 303, at 439.
378. BVA CHAIRMAN REPORT, supra note 302, at 22.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 5.
381. Id.
382. Berenson, supra note 287, at 113. For reference, the analogous rate for U.S. Courts
of Appeals was 75 percent in 2007. Id.
383. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Part Five: Inside the White House, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175, 194 (2008).
384. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
385. HARRIS, supra note 375, at 2.
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effectively manages the easy cases and leaves the expensive judicial
apparatus free to focus on ones in which its skills are needed, these
programs tend toward messy bureaucracies with the same expen-
sive judicial system imposed on top.
Even when compared with the ALJs who decide internal adminis-
trative appeals, bankruptcy judges come out ahead. With 14-year
terms, salaries set at 92 percent of those for Article III district court
judges, and a retirement plan that some think is better than its
Article III equivalent, bankruptcy judgeships are sought by the elite
of the legal profession.386 This is also one place where consumer
bankruptcy’s continued association with its corporate counterpart
is helpful, as many bankruptcy judges come from the top tiers of
business bankruptcy law.387 The job’s elite nature in and of itself
also sends a signal of respect to consumer bankruptcy filers.
Bankruptcy judges’ position outside a federal bureaucracy gives
them the independence necessary to make decisions in accordance
with their legal judgment.388 In a contrasting example, the ALJs in
the SSA have fought a long-running battle to avoid a review
designed to insure that their decisions meet the SSA’s cost objec-
tives.389 In 2000, the ALJs went so far as to unionize in response to
this tension.390
Bankruptcy’s high-quality decision makers have helped create a
consumer bankruptcy system that works relatively well from the
debtor perspective. Chapter 7 has a much higher “allowance”
rate—the percentage of claimants who receive the legal benefit for
which they are applying—than the administrative benefits pro-
grams.391 Debtors are not entangled in multiple layers of appeals
386. Mund, supra note 383, at 180, 196-97. A strong critic of the consumer bankruptcy
system, Fifth Circuit Judge Edith Jones echoes this high praise for bankruptcy judges. See
BABETTE CECCOTTI, EDITH H. JONES & JAMES I. SHEPARD, NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N,
DISSENT FROM RECOMMENDATION TO MAKE BANKRUPTCY JUDGES ARTICLE III JUDGES (1997),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/24commvi03.html (“The quality of candidates
applying for and being selected to bankruptcy judgeships has been very high.”).
387. Mund, supra note 383, at 196.
388. Id.
389. DISABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 305, at 18.
390. Id.
391. See supra tbl.3a.
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the way that administrative claimants are,392 and total processing
times are significantly shorter.393
Paradoxically, this judicial system has mastered the administra-
tive component of case processing much more effectively than the
administrative programs. It has done so by creating what is, in
essence, a judicial-administrative hybrid within the court system.
One commentator refers to this as “an administrative system that
happens to take place in a court.”394 Trustees and clerks’ offices
manage most of the work presented by the flood of LILA cases that,
from an efficiency perspective, expensive decision makers like
judges should not be handling.395 As a former, longtime member of
the Federal Judicial Center staff explained, “In a well-run bank-
ruptcy courthouse, a good deal of the repetitive work is handled by
the competent clerk and clerk’s staff, so that the judge can concen-
trate on the more interesting work of asset 7’s, 11’s, contested
matters and adversary proceedings.”396
There are at least two possible explanations for why judicial
consumer bankruptcy appears to function like an effective adminis-
trative system. One possibility is that there is little to “decide” in
LILA consumer bankruptcy case. A debtor does not need to demon-
strate technical insolvency, and the main eligibility requirement for
Chapter 7—the means test—applies to a small percentage of the
consumer bankruptcy population.397
This feature, however, distinguishes bankruptcy from only social
security disability and veterans’ benefits, not from welfare. Welfare
eligibility, too, is based on a lack of income. Its requirements are
primarily aimed at eliminating applicants who have other sources
of funds.398 Currently, welfare programs also engage in more in-
trusive screening, conducting home searches and fingerprinting and
disallowing individuals with criminal records or histories of drug
use.399 But these restrictions are not related to its core function the
392. See supra Part IV.A.1-2.
393. See supra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
394. Telephone Interview with Henry Sommer, supra note 176.
395. Robert D. Martin, A Riposte to Klee, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 454-55 (1997).
396. E-mail from Gordon Bermant, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Angela Littwin, Assistant
Professor of Law, Univ. of Tex. School of Law (Aug. 6, 2010, 20:49 CST) (on file with author).
397. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
399. See Gustafson, supra note 75, at 672, 675, 706-08.
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way that an inability to work is related to a disability determination
or injury during military service is related to veterans’ benefits.
Rather, they are part of a strategy of bureaucratic disentitlement,
and there is nothing inherent in bankruptcy to prevent it from
taking a similar approach.
Another possible reason for judicial consumer bankruptcy’s
administrative efficiency is the role of judges. Even though they
spend little time on each LILA case, judges may serve as an
important backstop, preventing the staff that does interact with
debtors from slowing down the process or putting up road blocks. As
the influential welfare commentator Michael Lipsky argued in his
classic article Bureaucratic Disentitlement, without countervailing
pressures, “bureaucrats may have plenty of reasons and opportuni-
ties to develop policy in ways that withdraw resources from
constituents, and may be inclined to be receptive to policy initiatives
that direct them to do so.”400 Invested judges may have stopped a
process like this before it could begin. 
Judges exert significant influence over how well the bankruptcy
process runs. Unlike in the benefits systems, the officials and
employees who manage the bankruptcy cases are directly account-
able to the judges. Bankruptcy judges appoint their own clerks and
hold the ultimate supervisory authority over them.401 The one
exception to judicial control is trustees, who represent the unse-
cured creditors’ interests in bankruptcy.402 In addition to other
functions, Chapter 7 trustees play a major administrative role, and
they are appointed by the U.S. Trustee (UST) rather than by
judges.403 Some have argued that many Chapter 7 trustees have
tended toward disentitlement, especially when the UST was rela-
tively politicized during the interval between the implementation of
BAPCPA and the election of a Democratic Congress in 2006.404
Because Chapter 7 trustees are paid by the case, and a small
400. Lipsky, supra note 92, at 22.
401. Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and The Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Part Four: The Separate Clerk’s Office, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 515, 536
(2007). 
402. See 11 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
403. Id. §§ 701(a), 702(d). Section 701(a) provides for the U.S. Trustee’s appointment of an
interim trustee. Because there are very few creditor’s committees in individual bankruptcies,
this appointment then becomes permanent by default under § 702(d).
404. Telephone Interview with Henry Sommer, supra note 176.
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number of asset-bearing cases generate most of their income, it is
in their interest to help create the kind of system the UST finds
desirable.405 
On the other hand, engaging in a practice of bureaucratic
disentitlement is time consuming and therefore expensive for an
official who is paid by the case. In most LILA cases, it would not be
worthwhile for a trustee to spend time challenging the debtor’s
paperwork. In addition, trustees do not act in isolation. Consumer
bankruptcy lawyers handle much of bankruptcy’s administrative
function, and they are directly accountable to the debtors. And in
comparison to administrative agency systems in which judges are
often not available until the third or fourth level of appeal, con-
sumer bankruptcy attorneys have relatively effective access to
judges when they see a need to challenge a trustee’s decision.406 This
may provide a counterweight against any trustee who might
otherwise use bureaucratic disentitlement.
But if bankruptcy judges have the power to make the system
function well, one important question remains: why, generally
speaking, do they seem to prefer a system that works? After all,
they also have the ability to make the system function poorly.
BAPCPA certainly handed them the tools to make consumer
bankruptcy much more technically difficult for the debtor,407 but by
and large, they have not done so. Is there something inherently
different about bankruptcy that enabled it to develop a core of
officials who appear to have little interest in procedural disen-
titlement? Or is it a result of consumer bankruptcy’s current
structure? The remainder of this Part considers these questions.
B. Bankruptcy’s Distinguishing Characteristics: Would They Be
Enough?
At this point, the bankruptcy-oriented reader is no doubt thinking
about the features that distinguish consumer bankruptcy from
poverty programs, of which there are several. The issue, however,
is not whether there are differences between these programs, but
405. National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees, Bankruptcy FAQ, http://www.
nabt.com/faq.cfm#Q11 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). 
406. See supra notes 376-83 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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rather how salient they are likely to be in the policy arena. The
question becomes whether these differences would be enough to
overcome the moral anxiety about redistribution. The fear of abuse
must be overcome not only in the mind of the reader, but more
importantly, in the minds of the policymakers who shape our
bankruptcy system.
The most significant difference between consumer bankruptcy
and the administrative benefits programs is that, to the extent that
redistribution takes place in bankruptcy, it is mostly from private
parties rather than from public funds. This is important because it
means that ordinary citizens, who may be struggling but not
seeking assistance, are not subsidizing the legal benefit. This re-
duces much of the sting of the moral anxiety surrounding redistri-
bution. Its importance may be seen in the credit industry’s large
investment in convincing the public that it is, in fact, subsidizing
consumer bankruptcy.408 A major argument made by creditor in-
terests in their recent campaign to tighten the bankruptcy laws was
that all consumers paid for bankruptcy in the form of higher
interest and reduced credit access.409 They even attempted to
quantify this cost as a $400 “bankruptcy tax.”410
In many ways, this argument has won the day, although the
precise impact of the credit industry’s campaigns is not clear. For
example, during the recent recession, one of the major arguments
voiced against allowing mortgage modification has been that it is
unfair to homeowners who did not borrow as much during the
housing boom—despite evidence that all homeowners may be
affected when foreclosure, the alternative to modification, occurs.411
This argument may have additional importance in practice that
is not apparent from the policy debates. The fact that the govern-
ment is not paying for the benefit at issue means that bankruptcy
officials are free from the substantive cost-cutting pressures that
benefits administrators face. Unlike an administrative bureaucrat,
a bankruptcy judge granting a discharge does not report to, work
with, or receive auditing by the officials who pay for the discharge. 
408. See Warren, supra note 67, at 77-78.
409. See id. at 83.
410. Id.
411. See, e.g., John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Matters of Principal, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2009, at A31.
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On the other hand, the fact that the redistribution is from pri-
vate actors, rather than the government, also works against
consumer bankruptcy. It means that there is always a well-financed
group with a strong interest in making the system less generous.
Moreover, in an administrative system, even though the debtors
would largely be pro se, the other side would likely have counsel in
matters with actual money at stake.412
A related difference between bankruptcy and benefits programs
is that, in bankruptcy, real redistribution often does not take place.
Much of the forgiven debt would have remained unpaid even
without bankruptcy.413 A $400 bankruptcy discharge is worth less
than a $400 welfare check because creditors were unlikely to see full
repayment even without bankruptcy. And though changes in
technology and secondary markets have increased the value of
bankruptcy debt,414 it is still worth far less than 100 cents on the
dollar.
The main limit of this distinction is that it does not seem to
penetrate policy debates very well. It has been obscured by credit-
industry-financed research arguing that these debts are, in fact,
collectible,415 and perhaps more importantly, it is something that
the credit industry and its supporters have simply not been willing
to believe, regardless of evidence to the contrary.416
A third distinction is that consumer bankruptcy filers are
sociologically middle class, whereas public benefits claimants are
living in poverty. Although most debtors have very low incomes at
412. Theoretically, this could be resolved by removing all foreclosures and other asset-
bearing cases from the administrative system. However, the decimation of the current
bankruptcy bar that would follow the establishment of such a system would limit the
availability of low-cost consumer attorneys in these cases as well. See infra Part IV.C.
413. See, e.g., Richard Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 127
(2004).
414. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Consumer,
73 MO. L. REV. 707, 714-16 (2008).
415. For example, Visa and MasterCard funded the notorious Credit Research Center
report claiming that “about 25 percent of Chapter 7 debtors could have repaid at least 30
percent of their nonhousing debts over a 5-year repayment plan, after accounting for monthly
expenses and housing payments.” Jensen, supra note 2, at 520-21. The validity of the study’s
conclusions has been a matter of much controversy. See generally Teresa A. Sullivan,
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An
Analysis of Creditors’ Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091.
416. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 91, at 448.
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the time of filing,417 they are middle class in terms of education,
occupational prestige, and education level.418 But welfare commen-
tators have argued the same proposition about their program’s
beneficiaries and the working class.419 Yet research showing that
recipients tend to cycle between welfare and traditional working-
class jobs has not dislodged the “culture of poverty” school of
thought that dominates policy circles.420 In addition, the very force
with which this middle-class argument has been made suggests that
its advocates are concerned that consumer bankruptcy filers are
vulnerable to being grouped with the chronic poor and possibly to
being treated like them.
In many ways, the ultimate question posed by this Article—what
are the underlying factors that make a redistributive program
successful?—is not objectively answerable. There is no way to
control for enough factors to conduct a study that would tell us, for
example, whether decision-maker qualifications or sociological class
status is more important. As a general matter, it seems fairly clear
that the moral fears that invariably accompany redistribution seem
to have done less damage in consumer bankruptcy than elsewhere.
This could be because of bankruptcy features unrelated to program
design, such as middle-class beneficiaries and private redistribu-
tion. But if there is a real possibility that the system’s structure,
particularly its use of lawyers and judges, has played a protective
role, we must be very careful when considering proposals to
abandon it. The following Section addresses specific features of a
judicial system that may have helped separate bankruptcy from
welfare.
C. The Benefits of Professionals
The most significant difference between judicial consumer
bankruptcy and its administrative counterpart is role of the lawyers
and judges who manage the system. There seems to be little
question that moving to an administrative system would end the
417. See Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 356-61.
418. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 27-33.
419. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1933 (2000).
420. See, e.g., id.; Law, supra note 82, at 475-79; Patricia Cohen, “Culture of Poverty,” Long
an Academic Slur, Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at A1.
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consumer bankruptcy bar as we know it. This is what occurred
when England changed systems in 1883.421 Stanley and Girth
acknowledged this in their detailed administrative blueprint back
in 1971.422 The consumer bankruptcy bar has certainly lobbied as
though this were the case whenever administrative bankruptcy has
been on the table.423 Indeed, eliminating the need for consumer
lawyers is a major selling point for administrative bankruptcy: it
would arguably reduce both the need to save up for a bankruptcy
lawyer and the risks of filing pro se. Although a reduction in law-
yers may thus appear to increase consumer access in the short term,
there are several ways in which consumer lawyers contribute to the
long-term workability of the system.
At the most basic level, lawyers help the system run smoothly.
They file accurate petitions.424 They manage a large portion of the
administrative work in each case. They enable consumers to avoid
the inaccurate information about bankruptcy that abounds in do-
it-yourself books and on the Internet.425 They serve a diagnostic
purpose, informing consumers which problems can be solved by
bankruptcy and which cannot. And the data analyzed in Part II
show that, in the wake of BAPCPA, they are crucial for clearing the
many new procedural hurdles that the legislation introduced. But
421. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 93.
422. STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 119, at 216 (“Attorneys for debtors would certainly lose
some business, but in most instances bankruptcy work is only a small part of their practice.”).
423. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
MICH. L. REV. 47, 84 (1997); see also SKEEL, supra note 60, at 92 (“In short, the legislative
evidence is too anecdotal to ‘prove’ that bankruptcy lawyers deserve much of the credit (or
blame) for thwarting the reforms, but the evidence surely is suggestive.”).
424. See supra Part IV.A.2.
425. For a sampling of inaccurate advice, see Mansi Aggarwal, Personal Bankruptcy Advice
Guide 101, EZINE ARTICLES, Jul. 20, 2006, http://ezinearticles.com/?Personal-Bankruptcy-
Advice-Guide-101&id=240041 (stating that after discharge, “the bankrupt person can avail
limited credit only as the legal system and his financial statement will not allow him to enjoy
credits beyond a certain limit”); Mike Hinshaw, Be Wary of Products Promising To Reveal
‘Bankruptcy Secrets’ (July 26, 2010), http://www.bankruptcycorner.com/bankruptcy-news/
2010/07/be-wary-of-products-promising-to-reveal-bankruptcy-secrets/ (“With a Straight
Bankruptcy or Chapter 7 bankruptcy the judge in bankruptcy court bangs his gavel and all
your debts instantly vanish—once and for all.... Under the Chapter 13 bankruptcy all your
debts remain. You're forced to repay each and every one right down to the last penny!”);
Declaring Personal Bankruptcy, http://www.declaringpersonalbankruptcy.net/ (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011) (“The thing to remember out here is that your income should be higher than
the median of the state. If it is lower then, you do not qualify for the Chapter 7 personal
bankruptcies. If it is higher, then you will probably do so even if the rules have changed.”).
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even before 2005, when the outcomes between pro se and repre-
sented consumers were not statistically distinguishable, they may
have played a prophylactic role. It is possible that the low pre-2005
pro se rate helped judges and court personnel give each such case
the attention it needed.
1. Lawyers as Consumer Advocates
Consumer bankruptcy lawyers are responsible for much of the
financial consumer protection enforcement that takes place. This
type of litigation is notoriously cost ineffective. The potential
awards are small, often lower than the cost of representation
itself.426 Thus, if a consumer right requires litigation, it will not
typically be enforceable.427 In addition, consumer litigation requires
consumers who are aware of their legal rights.428
The current model of consumer bankruptcy representation ad-
dresses these problems. Bankruptcy provides consumers with a
benefit important enough to enable lawyers to charge fees that are
high from a debtor perspective. It occurs with enough frequency to
allow lawyers to make a living off these fees, even though they are
low by standards of the profession. This combination has resulted
in the development of the high-volume practice, characterized by
cost-saving measures such as flat-fee representation and heavy use
of paralegals. Interestingly, though these features have been crit-
icized in the bankruptcy context, they are being urged as “best
practice” innovations in the general pro se literature,429 and they
have helped produce a consumer system with a remarkably low pro
se rate. As Professor Jean Braucher wrote nearly two decades ago:
426. See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy
as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 397, 397 (1994).
427. Braucher, supra note 10, at 413 n.28; see also Edward L. Rubin, The Code, the
Consumer, and the Institutional Structure of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 32-36
(1997). Professor Stuart Macaulay found that nonbankruptcy lawyers rarely take consumer
cases in his groundbreaking study. Stuart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws,
14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 115, 129 (1979).
428. See Macaulay, supra note 427, at 120-21.
429. See, e.g., JEANNE CHARN & RICHARD ZORZA, BELLOW-SACKS ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL
SERVS. PROJECT, CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 22-23, 32-33 (2005); see also
John T. Broderick, Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2010, at A21.
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From the perspective of consumer law in general, the most
striking feature of consumer bankruptcy practice is that it
exists. It not only exists—it is a booming practice area, one of
the few where middle to lower-middle class consumers are not
only served, but are the mainstay of the practice.430
Although bankruptcy attorneys typically charge on a flat-fee
basis, this representation often includes collateral matters for which
consumers would not otherwise be able to obtain representation.431
This stands in contrast to the situation in Canada, where the main
consumer bankruptcy professionals are accountant-trained trust-
ees.432 There, the trustees feel so constrained by their role that they
typically do not help debtors even with basic matters, such as
stopping collections harassment.433
A recent article by Professor Katherine Porter provides a useful
case study of how bankruptcy lawyers may play an important role
in consumer protection. In Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy
Mortgage Claims, Professor Porter found that mortgage claims in
bankruptcy cases were riddled with errors and missing documenta-
tion.434 Although she did not collect data in state courts, she hypo-
thesized that the situation would be even worse there, in part
because significantly fewer debtors would have representation.435
One of her most interesting proposed solutions involved educating
bankruptcy trustees about this issue and informing consumer
bankruptcy attorneys about the fee-generating causes of action
these errors may provide.436 Her research attracted substantial
publicity,437 and she was able to conduct some of the outreach she
430. Braucher, supra note 113, at 525-26. 
431. Whitford, supra note 426, at 402.
432. Iain Ramsay, Market Imperatives, Professional Discretion, and the Role of
Intermediaries in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Study of the Canadian Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399 (2000).
433. Id. at 449; see also id. at 419 (“Most trustees would indicate to consumers their rights
in relation to collection practices but only a minority seemed interested in actively providing
a consumer with material on how to address harassment.”).
434. Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 121, 121 (2008).
435. Id. at 124.
436. Id. at 177-78.
437. See Gretchen Morgenson, Dubious Fees Hit Borrowers in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2007, at A1.
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proposed.438 Anecdotally, these efforts appear to have been success-
ful. A number of reports suggest that banks are starting to lose
cases when they cannot produce basic mortgage documents.439
Porter also advocated for more systemic reform,440 and ultimately,
the Bankruptcy Rules Committee has proposed new rules to im-
prove the process.441 None of this would have been possible without
an existing bar that could move quickly on newly available con-
sumer protection claims. Moreover, researchers would have much
greater difficulty in identifying problems like this to study if astute
lawyers and judges were not noticing them in their work every day.
2. A Paid Bar
Beyond the importance of lawyers in general, there are benefits
to having a paid bar rather than relying on pro bono and legal aid
lawyers. Representatives of stigmatized populations share some of
that stigma with their clients and are easy targets for policymakers
seeking to reduce program use. Both bankruptcy and welfare law-
yers have been the subject of recent congressional attacks,442 but
those attacks have been much less successful in the bankruptcy
arena. Because bankruptcy lawyers are privately funded, Congress
could act only indirectly through changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
As discussed in Part II, the resulting amendments did raise legal
fees and probably contributed to an increasing pro se problem, but
these results pale in comparison with the damage sustained by
legal services practices in the 1990s.443 Because the federal govern-
ment funds legal services programs through the Legal Services
Corporation, Congress was able to impose direct restrictions. These
included bans on class actions,444 prohibitions on receiving remuner-
438. Id.
439. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Flawed Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A1.
440. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
441. See FED. R. BANKR. P. (with 2009 amendments), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK-Rules.pdf.
442. See Mann, supra note 11, at 394 (“Indeed, some observers view much of the Act as
laying an elaborate trap for those who make a living out of representing consumer
bankrupts.”); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 533 (2000).
443. See Super, supra note 114, at 1094.
444. Id.
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ation through fee-shifting statutes,445 and subject-matter limitations
in welfare cases.446 These changes reduced already struggling wel-
fare practices to almost nothing.447
In addition, consumer bankruptcy practices are financially self-
sustaining. When demand increases—for example, during reces-
sions—lawyers can expand their practices to meet it. This contrasts
with legal aid organizations, which have more difficulty raising
funds when the economy is tight, even though their caseloads also
increase during hard times.448 Similarly, consumer bankruptcy
lawyers do not have to spend resources on fundraising and recruit-
ing pro bono assistance the way free legal programs do. That time
and money may instead be spent on advertising, which though
criticized by some,449 can improve consumer awareness,450 an
important issue in areas of law where rights are underutilized.451
3. Lawyers as Lobbyists
A paid consumer bar creates a permanent consumer-debtor
interest group. Consumer bankruptcy filers are a textbook case of
an interest that cannot organize effectively. They are a diffuse,
stigmatized group of which nobody expects to become a member.452
445. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2004), repealed by 45 C.F.R. § 1642 (2010)).
446. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 533.
447. See Super, supra note 114, at 1094.
448. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Courts Seek More Lawyers To Help the Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2010, at A26.
449. Mann, supra note 11, at 394 n.91 (citing Senator Grassley’s criticisms of bankruptcy
lawyers).
450. Braucher, supra note 113, at 545.
451. In the welfare context, a high percentage of families who are eligible for food stamps
do not apply for them. Gustafson, supra note 75, at 678 n.159 (citing KAREN E. CUNNYNGHAM
ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., REACHING THOSE IN NEED: STATE FOOD STAMP
PARTICIPATION RATES IN 2006, at 5 (2008)). For bankruptcy, see Michelle White, Why Don’t
More Households File for Bankruptcy? 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1998) (calculating that
15 percent or more of U.S. households would benefit from bankruptcy, but only 1 percent file
annually).
452. See, e.g., Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform: A Classic Battle over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 509, 523 (2003)
(“Individual debtors would logically be against the Reform Legislation or its prior versions;
however, there are millions of debtors with interests so diverse that they are not an effective
lobbying force. Organizing such a group, coupled with the stigma often attached to debtors,
is riddled with collective action problems.”); Posner, supra note 423, at 47 (“[D]ebtors,
considered as the class of people who are potential beneficiaries of bankruptcy law, do not
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It is their lawyers who have a long-term, personal stake in main-
taining a consumer-friendly system.453 Consumer bankruptcy law-
yers make an ideal interest group because they are “a relatively
small number of people with similar interests and a lot at stake,”
who therefore, according to public choice theory, “will have more of
an incentive to organize into politically effective interest groups.”454
There is a strong argument that lawyers account for much of the
debtor friendliness that characterizes U.S. consumer bankruptcy
law. There is little dispute that lawyers have had a major impact on
the shape of the system. Professor David Skeel provides perhaps the
strongest form of the argument. In his history Debt’s Dominion, he
argues that the bankruptcy bar is responsible for the very existence
of a permanent consumer bankruptcy regime.455 More generally, he
also states that “no other group has had nearly so pervasive an
impact on bankruptcy law as the bankruptcy bar.”456 Many commen-
tators agree that lawyers have played a formidable role.457 They
argue that an important reason why lawyers have been so success-
ful in bankruptcy is that it is perceived as a technical area of law.458
Complex subjects often require policymakers to defer to experts with
a better understanding of the issues. A perception of complexity also
compose an organized and politically influential group.”).
453. Consumer advocates and academics have also played an important role here, but their
livelihoods are not dependent on a generous bankruptcy regime. See SKEEL, supra note 60,
at 192-94, 203.
454. Posner, supra note 423, at 59.
455. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 44-47. Skeel argues that the emergence of the individual-
debtor bankruptcy bar as an effective lobbying force is what prevented the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 from being repealed within a few years, as had been the case with all of its
predecessors. Id. at 45. According to this account, Republican political control for much of the
first decade of the twentieth century prevented its immediate repeal, and by the time
Democrats gained power, the law had been in place long enough for the bankruptcy bar to
emerge to preserve it.
456. David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Shape of American Bankruptcy Law,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 498 (1998).
457. Iain D.C. Ramsay, Functionalism and Political Economy in the Comparative Study of
Consumer Insolvency: An Unfinished Story from England and Wales, 7 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 625, 627 (2006). For a purely financial account of lawyers’ motives in this
respect, see Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2087 (2003) (reviewing SKEEL, supra note 60). For a more textured
account, see Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Professionals in Systemic Reform of
Bankruptcy Law: The 1978 U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the English Insolvency Act 1986, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 35, 74 (2000).
458. Iain Ramsay, Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 264.
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provides them with cover, allowing them to defer to interest groups
without the general electorate, or even other politicians, noticing.459
It enables statutory changes to appear “merely” technical in nature
and fly “underneath the wider horizon of political debate.”460
The role that consumer bankruptcy lawyers have played in
shaping legislation is often portrayed in a negative light. These
activities have been viewed as obstructionist461 and as exclusively
motivated by financial gain.462 Professor Skeel takes an intermedi-
ate approach, arguing that the bar’s influence has led to a number
of inefficiencies but that they should not be overstated.463
But for those who favor a strong consumer bankruptcy regime
with an accessible discharge, lawyers’ efforts may have had a
positive impact. As Professor Skeel states, “The obvious explanation
for bankruptcy’s pro-debtor bias is the bankruptcy bar.”464 Professor
Iain Ramsay supports this argument, stating that “if the U.S.
consumer bankruptcy system is unique, it is partly because of the
central role of lawyers in consumer bankruptcy administration and
policy.”465 Professor Ramsay adds a comparative perspective to this
picture, arguing more broadly that the type of interest groups
prominent in the legislative arena will heavily influence the law’s
ultimate pro-creditor or pro-debtor orientation.466
This account also partially explains consumer bankruptcy’s recent
turn in the pro-creditor direction by tying it to a decline in the
influence of consumer lawyers. One major factor behind the first
459. Carruthers & Halliday, supra note 457, at 74.
460. Id.; see also Ramsay, supra note 457, at 640.
461. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing Business Bankruptcy Law, 74
AM. BANKR. L.J. 77, 88 (2000) (“Public choice theorists often view lawyers as obstructionist
forces who oppose important changes to the legal status quo in order to protect against
encroachments upon their livelihood.”).
462. Zywicki, supra note 457, at 2022 (“Bankruptcy lawyers have clear goals—to increase
the number of bankruptcies filed and the expense of each.”)
463. Skeel, supra note 456, at 518, 520-21.
464. Id. at 518.
465. Ramsay, supra note 458, at 270.
466. Iain Ramsay, Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in
Canada, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 379, 423 (2003) (“[A]n interest group analysis is central to
understanding the specific institutional features of consumer bankruptcy law in a country and
the reasons for which a regime might ultimately be described as creditor- or debtor-friendly.”).
In a separate article, Ramsay discusses the comparable role that Canadian bankruptcy
trustees have played there. Ramsay, supra note 458, at 271.
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contraction of the consumer bankruptcy regime in more than a
century was the politicization of the debate, which, in turn, reduced
the comparative importance of legal experts, including debtor
lawyers.467 
Between the passage of the modern Code in 1978 and BAPCPA
in 2005, consumer bankruptcy became highly politicized, shedding
its image as a neutral, technical subject.468 One major reason for this
change was the emergence of the consumer credit industry as a
lobbying force.469 This development was driven by several factors,
the most important being the ever-increasing number of consumer
bankruptcy filings.470 The skyrocketing bankruptcy rate gave con-
sumer credit issuers a larger stake in each change in the bank-
ruptcy laws.471 Simultaneously, innovations in data processing
further increased their interest by making each dollar of about-to-
be-discharged debt more valuable.472 
The debates leading up to BAPCPA also mobilized the consumer
bankruptcy bar. This group’s main professional organization, the
National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA),
was formed in 1992 when it became clear that Congress was going
to reexamine the bankruptcy statute.473 As Professor Elizabeth
Warren described it, “The political story of bankruptcy in the 1990s
is how these two groups—bankruptcy professionals and interest
groups—compete for dominance in shaping congressional directives
on bankruptcy.”474 The professionals lost, and the result was
BAPCPA.
BAPCPA, however, has been far from a total loss for consumer
debtors. Just last year, bankruptcy filings returned to their pre-
467. See, e.g., Carruthers & Halliday, supra note 457, at 75. 
468. See id.
469. Elizabeth Warren, The Changing Politics of American Bankruptcy Reform, 37
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 189, 193 (1999). Professor Skeel argues that two other factors were
behind the change in tone: the 1994 change in congressional control and the newly emerging
divisiveness within the academic bankruptcy community over the role of law and economics
scholarship. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 199-202.
470. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 200, 202; Warren, supra note 469, at 203.
471. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 202.
472. See Haneman, supra note 414, at 714-16.
473. Telephone Interview with Maureen Thompson, Legislation Dir., NACBA (Dec. 13,
2010).
474. Warren, supra note 469, at 190.
2018 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1933
BAPCPA levels,475 and as discussed in Part II, the vast majority of
those who do file still receive their discharge. This is partly because
there has never been a large population of “can-pay” consumer
bankruptcy filers for the new means test to screen.476 
It is also due to the fact that the consumer bankruptcy bar did not
resign in defeat after BAPCPA’s passage. In what must be an irony
to BAPCPA’s drafters, the law’s passage caused the organizing
efforts of the consumer bankruptcy bar to gain momentum.
NACBA’s membership has more than doubled since 2005, increasing
from 2000 members then to 5000 by the end of 2010.477 One effect of
this mobilization was that, once BAPCPA was passed, NACBA was
in a position to offer training on the new law in an organized and
integrated manner.478 Its legal education program became a factor
in the consumer bankruptcy bar’s relatively smooth transition to
practicing under the complex new statute.479 BAPCPA’s relatively
limited disentitlement effects are also due to the broader response
of the bench and bar to the new law, which is discussed in the next
Section.
4. Professionalism and Effectiveness
Consumer bankruptcy’s location in the judicial branch has
enabled the development of a corps of professionals with a commit-
ment to a workable system. In addition to consumer lawyers, this
community includes judges and corporate bankruptcy attorneys.
These professionals were particularly important in implementing
BAPCPA in a way that mitigated the effects of the statute’s at-
tempts at bureaucratic disentitlement. 
A key example of the professionals’ influence in limiting bureau-
cratic disentitlement was their role in drafting the Bankruptcy
Rules. After BAPCPA’s passage in April 2005, there were only six
months to prepare for its implementation. The Bankruptcy Rules
475. See Lawless, supra note 37.
476. See Lawless et al., supra note 3, at 351.
477. Telephone Interview with Maureen Thompson, supra note 473; Nat’l Assn. of
Consumer Bankr. Attorneys, About Us, http://www.NACBA.org/AboutUs.aspx (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011).
478. Telephone Interview with Maureen Thompson, supra note 473.
479. Id.
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Committee—which included debtor and creditor attorneys from
consumer and corporate practices as well as academics, judges, and
officials from the U.S. Trustee Program480—was tasked with
drafting an immense number of rules and forms.
Of particular importance was the implementation of the means
test.481 One very plausible reading of § 707(b) would have required
all debtors to complete and provide documentation for the expenses
calculation in the means test,482 even though, logically, this would
be unnecessary for debtors with incomes at or below their state’s
median. Debtors with incomes below this threshold cannot be
challenged on their expenses,483 so requiring that they list and
document them would have created a procedural burden with no
substantive relevance. This paperwork is particularly technical and
time consuming, and this reading of § 707(b) would have increased
it in nearly 90 percent of Chapter 7 cases.484 It could have had a
large impact on legal prices and pro se failure, with no improvement
in the substantive effectiveness of the means test. 
But the Rules Committee maintained a professionalized orienta-
tion that focused on how to keep the consumer bankruptcy system
manageable, and it ultimately decided to not require below-median
debtors to complete this paperwork.485 That decision in and of itself
probably prevented bankruptcy from procedurally disentitling a
large number of its substantively eligible beneficiaries.
This culture of professionalism has benefitted consumer debtors
in several other ways as well. One advantage of keeping consumer
bankruptcy in the judicial system is that it has allowed consumer
480. See, e.g., Meeting Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, Meeting
of August 3-5, 2005, Washington, D.C., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/
rules/Minutes/BK08-2005-min.pdf. 
481. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).
482. Section 707(b)(2)(C) states that “the debtor shall include a statement of ... the
calculations that determine whether a presumption arises under subparagraph (A)(i), that
show how each such amount is calculated.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(C). This suggests that all
debtors would need to provide precise numbers for the expense portion of the means test,
which is described in subparagraph (A)(ii) (incorporated by reference in subparagraph (A)(i)).
483. Id. § 707(b)(7).
484. In the 2007 CBP’s Chapter 7 sample, 88.8 percent of debtors had incomes at or below
their state’s median. Only 7.8 percent had incomes above this threshold. Another 3.3 percent
failed to check either box on their bankruptcy petitions.
485. Bankruptcy Form 22A (Chapter 7), Part III, line 15 (instructing below-median debtors:
“do not complete Parts IV, V, VI or VII”).
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and corporate bankruptcy to develop in parallel. Many academics
write in both areas, and the field’s two major journals—the
American Bankruptcy Law Journal and the American Bankruptcy
Institute Journal—cover both topics.
Although practitioners in these areas constitute two distinct bars,
there is some sense of practicing in the same field, which has
several positive spillover effects. The sense of joint enterprise en-
hances the prestige of consumer bankruptcy, as corporate bank-
ruptcy lawyers are among the most successful in the profession.
This prestige is important in countering the seedy reputation that
has plagued consumer bankruptcy and that could otherwise deter
qualified people from entering the field.486 
More basically, consumer and corporate bankruptcy share the
same statute. Many Code provisions apply to both contexts, which
may serve to check a potential slide into bureaucratic disentitlement
on the consumer side. BAPCPA’s drafters appear to have been
aware that the statute’s combined application exerts an upward
pressure on consumer debtors’ rights. In key areas, BAPCPA care-
fully carved out consumer exceptions to provisions that have long
applied to both contexts.487
Corporate practitioners have taken a proprietary interest in
consumer matters. This is important when Congress is considering
bankruptcy legislation,488 although this was more effective in the
1970s than in the politicized environment in which BAPCPA was
debated.489 Corporate bankruptcy lawyers also played a large role in
the Rules Committee work discussed above.490
Judges have been a key in maintaining the connection between
the two halves of the field. The fact that the actors at the top of the
bankruptcy hierarchy have a foot in the consumer and corporate
worlds further enhances the link between them.491 A number of
486. SKEEL, supra note 60, at 192 (stating that following the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 “increasing visibility of corporate bankruptcy ... has had a positive ripple
effect on the status of the consumer bankruptcy bar”).
487. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2006), which was amended by BAPCPA to require
different measures for valuing collateral that apply only when the debtor is an individual.
488. Warren, supra note 469, at 191.
489. Id. at 201-02.
490. See supra notes 480-85 and accompanying text.
491. For example, a significant number of corporate lawyers attend the annual meeting of
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, yet the meeting continues to offer panels on
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judges also embody this relationship through their biographies.
Many come from the corporate arena, but the job itself consists of
mostly consumer adjudication.
This brings us to the question posed at the end of Part IV.A.3:
why do bankruptcy judges as a group seem to favor a functional
consumer system when this is not true of decision makers in many
other redistributive programs? Although judges played a reduced
role in the legislative debates leading to BAPCPA,492 they were
highly influential in earlier decades,493 and they were important
players within the Rules Committee.494 Part of the answer must be
their role in the system. Unlike lawyers, their financial well-being
is not directly tied to the usability of consumer bankruptcy.495 But
their prestige and job satisfaction are closely aligned with the
system’s success, and the visibility of the job means that they are
publicly identified with consumer bankruptcy’s accomplishments
and failures. In addition, the functionality of the system is self-
perpetuating. Professionals who care about these issues are likely
to see a well-run consumer bankruptcy system as a forum where
they can play a positive role and are therefore more likely to seek
bankruptcy judgeships in the first place.
The relationship with corporate bankruptcy also probably affects
the way judges view consumer debtors. Working with corporate
bankruptcy—in which insolvency is treated in a matter-of-fact
manner rather than as a moral issue—makes it more likely that
judges will apply a similar lens to consumer insolvency. In corporate
bankruptcies, judges are dealing with some of the most sophisti-
cated lawyers in the profession, and this promotes a culture in
which litigants are generally treated with respect. In addition,
bankruptcy judges’ mixed caseloads lower their risk for burnout
when compared to analogous adjudicators who hear only poverty-
related cases.
consumer topics.
492. Warren, supra note 469, at 201 (noting that many judges became reluctant to
participate in the legislative debates as bankruptcy became more politicized).
493. See SKEEL, supra note 60, at 194; Mund, supra note 383, at 196-97.
494. See supra note 480.
495. With 14-year terms, they are less likely to be affected by a contraction in bankruptcy
filings. In addition, because of the prestige of bankruptcy judgeships and because many of
them come from corporate bankruptcy backgrounds, they have a variety of options upon
leaving the bench.
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Some combination of these factors has left consumer bankruptcy
with a body of decision makers who are unlikely to let the system
slide into the type of dysfunction that plagues our administrative
state.
CONCLUSION: SOME THOUGHTS ON REFORM
If how a legal system treats its pro se claimants is an important
indicator of its overall accessibility, post-BAPCPA consumer
bankruptcy is on middle ground. It has fallen from its earlier grace,
especially with respect to Chapter 7. But when viewed through the
lens of other redistributive programs, it is still surprisingly suc-
cessful. The reasons for this may have less to do with specific
statutory provisions than with the fact that the professionals who
run the system want it to be effective. 
The larger point is that we cannot design a consumer bankruptcy
system based on only what would be most efficient on a conceptual
level. Consumer bankruptcy will always be haunted by moral anx-
iety and a fear of abuse, and thus will always be vulnerable to
strategies of bureaucratic disentitlement. These considerations
mean we must also consider how to retain professionals who are
likely to act in good faith and how to give them enough power to
protect the integrity of the system.
Pre-BAPCPA Chapter 7 achieved this balance. On one hand, it
was simple enough that its judicial machinery did not overwhelm its
efficient administration. On the other hand, a strong bench and
active debtor bar prevented its slide into the administrative morass
that has plagued other social welfare programs. Of the 463 Chapter
7 debtors studied by the 2001 CBP, all but three received a dis-
charge, and none of those three filed pro se.496 And this was a sys-
tem that processed more than a million cases per year. For those for
whom the specter of abuse is very real, these figures were alarming
and were indeed what lead to the system’s change. But for those
who take seriously the empirical data that has time and again
portrayed the crushing financial distress experienced by the over-
whelming majority of consumer bankruptcy filers, the pre-BAPCPA
system was a remarkable success. It remains a worthwhile bench-
496. See supra tbl.3a.
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mark as we move forward with strategizing about where consumer
bankruptcy should go from here.
